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STEM CELLS AND THE STATES:
PROMULGATING CONSTITUTIONAL BANS
ON EMBRYONIC EXPERIMENTATION
By general law, life and limb must be protected,
yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;
but a life is never wisely given to save a limb.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is hardly disputed that the "summer potboiler" lawmakers faced
in 2001 involved the destiny of thousands of tiny embryos stored in
fertility clinics across the nation. 2 Other than the issue of war, President
George W. Bush himself perceived the stem cell decision as "the biggest
3
of his presidency in terms of long-term impact."
While fetal experimentation and other forms of research on unborn
children have been on the forefront of scientific debate for years, the
issue of stem cell research did not surface until the late 1990s. 4 Yet, the
groundwork for stem cell research initially began with the introduction
of in vitro fertilization ("lVF") technology in the 1970s. 5 Not only a tool
used to research live human embryos, 1VF continues to attract a growing
number of infertile couples that cannot naturally conceive their own
children. 6 Through the IVF process, mature eggs are obtained from the
woman and fertilized in a lab. 7 After fertilization, the newly created
8
embryos are placed into the woman's uterus.
Because not all of the embryos will successfully implant on the
uterine wall, many embryos are created and several are injected into the
uterus. 9 Thus, between the IVF process itself and the use of fertility
I

Letter from Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 2,000 CLASSIC LEGAL
QUOTATIONS 358 (M. Frances McNamara ed., 1992).
2
Terence Samuel, Matters of Life and Death, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 30, 2001, at
14.
3
Id.at 17.
4
Susan Lee, Human Stem Cell Research: NIH Releases Draft Guidelinesfor Comment, 28 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 81, 81-82 (2000).
5
Ronald M. Green, Stopping Embryo Research, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 235, 237 (1999).
6
Id.; Samuel B. Casey, How the Law Will Shape Life and Death Decisions: The Case of the
Human Embryo, BIO ENGAGEMENT 150 (Nigel M. de S. Cameron et al. eds., 2000).
7
Casey, supra note 6, at 151 n.8.
8
Id.
9
See generally Green, supra note 5, at 241 (stating that "up to two-thirds of all fertilized
eggs do not implant").
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drugs given to women at fertility clinics, IVF programs generally create
more embryos than the number of children the couple actually desires. 10
Those embryos not immediately injected into the woman are frozen alive
through a process called cryopreservation.1 These "spare embryos" can
then be used for implantation at a later time. 12 The IVF clinics generally
store these frozen embryos for a fixed number of years, after which the
parents must make a decision: either pay an annual fee to continue the
storage, implant the remaining embryos, destroy the embryos, or donate
the embryos for some purpose. 13 These spare embryos, created with the
purpose of growing into children and adults, are the central focus of the
stem cell research debate.
In 1999, an estimated 150,000 living embryos were stored in the
nation's IVF clinics. 14
Frozen in liquid nitrogen tanks through
cryopreservation, at least 19,000 embryos are added to their ranks each
year.' 5 The conservative estimate for the number of frozen embryos in

10

Casey, supra note 6, at 151.
Id. Cryopreservation is the "storage of living tissue in extreme cold." Michael
Cannell, Ice Age at the Zoo, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1999, at Al. In cryopreservation,
embryos are immersed in a liquid consisting of sucrose, or common table sugar, and
propanediol. Sally Squires, Pre-embryosin a Frozen Tank, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1988, at
Z16. This substance protects the embryos when they are frozen. Id. The embryos are then
vacuum sealed in a tank by liquid nitrogen, frozen at a temperature of minus 196 degrees
centigrade. Id. The tanks that store the frozen embryos are refilled daily. Id. Experiments
with cryopreservation began in the late 1940s, and the process has been used for the last
fifteen years as a reproductive technique in cattle breeding. Judy Licht, Frozen in Time;
Storing of Embryos Boosts the Chances of Pregnancy-And Raises Ethical Questions, THE WASH.
POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at Z10.
12
Opportunities and Advancements in Stem Cell Research: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 107th Cong. 74-75 (2001)
[hereinafter Davidson] (statement of JoAnn Davidson, Program Director for the Snowflakes
Embryo Adoption Program); Harold E. Varmus, M.D., The Challenge of Making Law on the
Shifting Terrain of Science, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 46, 49 (2000).
13
Davidson, supra note 12, at 75. Examples of such donations include research
purposes, such as stem cell research, and embryonic adoption. Id.; see also Rita Rubin,
100,000 Frozen Embryos: One Couple's Surplus can Fill Void of Another, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 8,
1988, at IA (outlining the growing practice of donating embryos to infertile couples or
single women for adoption); Text of PresidentBush's Speech, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2001,
at A12 (stating that parents should be allowed to donate their embryos to science).
14
Lori B. Andrews, Embryonic Confusion: Mhen You Think Conception, You Don't Think
Product Liability. Think Again., THE WASH. POST, May 2, 1999, at B1; see also Davidson, supra
note 12, at 75; Casey, supra note 6, at 152.
15
Andrews, supra note 14, at B1.
11
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2001 was 188,000.16 The question facing parents, researchers, and
lawmakers-indeed, the entire nation-is, what do we do with them now?
The scientific community and many lawmakers are urging the use of
the embryos for embryonic stem cell research, as stem cells are thought
17
to hold the key for treating or curing many degenerative conditions.
Embryonic stem cells, the building block cells that eventually develop
into specialized cells and tissues, were first isolated and cultured by two
research teams in 1998.18 Stem cells are derived from embryos in the
blastocyst stage of development. 19 During this blastocyst stage, when
the inner cell mass of the embryo contains 200 to 300 cells, the cells
divide and begin to form a hollow ball. 20 The shell surrounding the
inner mass is destroyed and the cells are removed.2' These cells continue
to grow in petri dishes and can be coaxed into differentiating or
developing into various cell types. 22
The process of removing the inner cell mass, or stem cells, is
performed only on living human embryos. 23
The embryos are

16 Davidson, supra note 12, at 78.
17 Kevin P. Quinn, Embryonic Stem Cell Research as an Ethical Issue: On the Emptiness of
Symbolic Value, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 851, 851 (2001). Such conditions include Parkinson's
disease, Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, and spinal cord injuries. Id. Many scientists believe
that advances through stem cell research will include repairing and replacing damaged
organs. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Stem Cell Debate in House Has Two Faces, Both Young, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2001, at Al. However, the long-term consequences of treatments from stem
cells are unknown. Gretchen Vogel, Can Adult Stem Cells Suffice?, 292 Sci. 1820, 1822 (June
8, 2001) [hereinafter Vogel I]. Experiment results in animal studies are rarely observed for
longer than one year. Id.
18 Lee, supra note 4, at 81; Quinn, supra note 17, at 851; Stolberg, supra note 17, at Al; see
also Laurie McGinley, Influenced GOP Sen. Frist Supports Stem-Cell Research, THE WALL ST. J.,
July 18, 2001, at A20 (terming embryonic stem cells as "primitive building-block cells").
19 Quinn, supra note 17, at 852. Such embryos are usually "in the first two weeks of
development, before or just up to the early processes of cellular differentiation, tissue
formation, and the appearance of rudimentary bodily form." Green, supra note 5, at 236-37.
Another source indicates that stem cells are extracted from five-day-old embryos. Rachel
K.Sobel, From Tiny Cells Comes Uncertain Silence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 30, 2001, at
17.
20 THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE xvii (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001);
Varmus, supra note 12, at 48; Stolberg, supra note 17, at Al. Other sources indicate that the
embryos contain as few as 100 cells. Jose B. Cibelli et al., The First Human Cloned Embryo,
Sci. AM., Jan. 2002, at 45.
21 THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supranote 20, at xvii; Varmus, supra note
12, at 48. If allowed to develop, the outer shell would become the placenta. THE HUMAN
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xvii.
22 Quinn, supra note 17, at 852; Varmus, supra note 12, at 48.
23 THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xviii.
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inescapably destroyed. 24 Those opposing the destruction of embryonic
life include pro-life advocates, congressmen, ethicists, and even some
geneticists and scientists. 25 Several states, asserting their interest in the
protection of human life, have reacted to the rise in experimentation by
banning all embryonic research within their borders. 26 Such bans,
however, do not always stand the test of the United States court system,
and the Supreme Court has provided no guidance in promulgating
27
constitutional laws.
This Note will address the issues surrounding the constitutionality
of state bans on experimentation and will propose model statutes for
those states desiring to continue protecting their interest in human life.
First, this Note will discuss the background of the stem cell research
debate. 28 Second, this Note will analyze current state bans on embryonic
experimentation. 29 Third, this Note will set forth what actions should be

24 Id.; Quinn, supra note 17, at 852.
25 See Samuel, supra note 2, at 16-17. See generally Opportunities and Advancements in Stem
Cell Research: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, 107th Cong. 178 (2001) (statement of Christopher Hook, M.D., Senior Fellow of
the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity); Opportunities and Advancements in Stem Cell
Research: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, 107th Cong. 111 (2001) [hereinafter Prentice] (statement of Dr. David A. Prentice,
Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of Medical and Molecular Genetics, Indiana University School of
Medicine); The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity, On Human Embryos and Stem Cell
Research: An Appeal for Legally and Ethically Responsible Science and Public Policy, available at
http://www.cbhd.org/resources/aps/statement/htm
(last visited Aug. 24, 2002)
[hereinafter CBHD]. The organization "Do No Harm" is a national coalition of researchers,
health care professionals, bioethicists, and legal professionals united in advancing the
development of medical treatments and therapies that do not require the destruction of
human life. Do No Harm: The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics (an. 2001),
available at http://www.stemcellresearch.org/info/escproblems.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2002). The coalition also works to educate the public and public policymakers about
promising areas of medical research that do not involve the destruction of human embryos.
Id. The coalition's name is taken from the Hippocratic Oath, which states, "As to diseases,
make a habit of two things-to help, or at least do no harm." Id., available at http://www.
stemcellresearch.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2002).
26 See infra Part III.B.1.
27 See Andrews, supra note 14, at B1 ("[N]owhere is the lack of precedents more
complicated than in dealing with frozen embryos."); see also Sharon M. Parker, Comment,
Bringing the "Gospel of Life" to American Jurisprudence: A Religious, Ethical, and Philosophical
Critique of Federal Fundingfor Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 771, 772 (2001) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence has not been
dispositive of the issues surrounding early human life.").
28 See infra Part II.
29 See infra Part III.
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taken in attempting to promulgate a constitutional ban and will propose
30
two model statutes.
II.

SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE STEM CELL DEBATE

Stem cell research is an enormous topic, encompassing a vast array
of scientific and legal issues. Thus, it is important to have a general
knowledge of several issues before evaluating the constitutionality of
state bans on embryonic research. This Part will first provide a general
explanation of the science of stem cell research, including recent
31
breakthroughs and possible advances in the treatments of diseases.
Second, this Part will discuss federal law and legislation regarding stem
cell research. 32 Subsequently, an overview of current Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the related issue of abortion and mothers' rights will be
provided. 33 Lastly, this Part includes a discussion of the court decisions
striking down three state statutes banning embryonic research. 34
A.

The Science of Stem Cell Research

Human stem cells have been found in almost every area of the body
and are classified as either pluripotent or totipotent. 35 Pluripotent stem
cells are the earliest stem cells, and they develop into the cells and tissues
37
of the body. 36 These cells can only form a limited number of cell types.
For example, blood stem cells renew and can develop into more
specialized blood cells. 38 Totipotent stem cells, however, are not limited

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.
32
See infra Part II.B.
33
See infra Part II.C.
34
See infra Part II.D.
35
Prentice, supra note 25, at 112-14; THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra
note 20, at xvii-xviii. Stem cells have been defined as "immature cells that can replicate
themselves and give rise to daughter cells." Vogel I, supra note 17, at 1820.
36
THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xvii-xviii; Varmus, supra
note 12, at 48.
37
Cloning, 2001: Hearing on Sen. 790 Before a Senate Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Appropriations,107th Cong. 14, 16 (2001) [hereinafter West] (statement of Michael D. West,
Ph.D., President and CEO of Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.). However, some sources
indicate that with the right cues, pluripotent cells can give rise to any kind of cell in the
body. Vogel I, supra note 17, at 1820.
38
Varmus, supra note 12, at 48. However, recent advances in stem cell technology have
revealed that many pluripotent stem cells can actually develop into other types of stem
cells. CBHD, supra note 25. For example, pluripotent bone marrow stem cells have been
directed into forming fat, cartilage, and bone tissue. Id.
30
31
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and can form any tissue in the body. 39 In fact, these cells possess the
ability to develop into a complete organism. 40 Totipotent cells also
41
reproduce infinitely.
Stem cells are important to the development of medical science
because they possess the ability to self-renew. 42 For example, when a
person donates blood, bone marrow stem cells accelerate production to
replace blood cells. 43
The implications of such renewal indicate
significant potential for regenerative medicine. 44 Many diseases and
conditions debilitate and destroy organs. 45
Through regenerative
medicine, cells and tissues are grown and implanted into people with
failing tissues and organs. 46 Such transplants can restore loss of function,
cause malfunctioning cells to function properly, and replace dead cells
with new cells. 47 Because of the self-renewing nature of stem cells,
researchers believe that they hold the key to repairing tissues and
organs.4 8 Possible future treatments developed from stem cell research
include the restoration of central nervous system functioning and the
49
reparation of cardiac tissue damaged during heart attacks.

39

West, supra note 37, at 16.

40

THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xvii-xviii.

It is argued

that human embryonic stem cells, even after removal from embryos, may be capable of
redeveloping into mature human persons. Samuel B. Casey & Nathan A. Adams, Specially
Respecting the Living Human Embryo by Adhering to Standard Human Subject Experimentation
Rules, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 111, 112 (2001) [hereinafter Adams].
Experiments to rule out this possibility have not been conducted, and animal studies
suggest it is likely. Id. at 120. Mice embryonic stem cells, when implanted into female
mice, have given rise to mice born with the genetic makeup of the inserted embryonic stem
cells. Id. at 120 n.108.
41 Quinn, supra note 17, at 852.
42 THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xvii.
43 Thomas B. Okarma, Human Embryonic Stem Cells: A Primeron the Technology and Its
Medical Applications, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supranote 20, at 4.
4
Id. at 3.
45
Cloning, 2001: Hearing Before a Senate Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th

Cong. 23, 25 (2001) [hereinafter Vogelstein] (testimony of Bert Vogelstein, Chairman of the
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine Committee on Biological and
Biomedical Applications of Stem Cell Research).
46

Id.

47
The Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 and The Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001:
Hearing on H.R. 1644 and H.R. 2172 Before the Subcomm. on Health, 107th Cong. 49 (2001)
[hereinafter Okarma testimony] (statement of Thomas Okarma, President and CEO of
Geron Corporation, on behalf of Biotechnology Industry Organization).
48 Varmus, supranote 12, at 48.
49 Okarma, supra note 43, at 3.
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A distinction must be drawn between adult stem cells and
embryonic stem cells.50 Adult stem cells are derived post-natally from a
number of sources in the human body, including muscle tissue, bone
marrow, and fat cells. 51 Stem cells can also be derived from placenta and
umbilical cord blood cells. 52 Transplants using these cord blood cells can
53
act as substitutes for bone marrow transplants.
Embryonic stem cells, however, are harvested shortly after
conception.54 Because of their ability to grow into all of the body's
tissues, these stem cells are thought to hold more potential for future
treatments than adult stem cells.5 5 However, recent contrary evidence
may prove that assertion false because many possible treatments from
embryonic stem cells remain speculative. 56 For example, embryonic stem
cells have never been successfully used in clinical trials with human

5
See generally Prentice, supra note 25, at 112-113; Stem Cells, 2001: Hearings Before a
Senate Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 44, 47 [hereinafter Usala]
(statement of Anton-Lewis Usala, M.D., Founder and Chief Scientific Officer of Encelle,
Inc.).
51 Prentice, supra note 25, at 112-14.
52
Opportunities and Advancements in Stem Cell Research: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 107th Cong. 100, 101 (2001)
[hereinafter Salley] (statement of Nathan Salley, cord blood transplant recipient); Text of
PresidentBush's Speech, supra note 13, at A12.
53 Salley, supra note 52, at 100-01. It is also claimed that placental cells can differentiate
into nerves and blood vessels. Vogel I, supranote 17, at 1821.
54 Usala, supra note 50, at 48 (stating that "the mass of cells that begins the process of
specific differentiation occurs very shortly after conception"); James A. Thomson, Human
Embryonic Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at 15;
see also Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 Sci.
1145, 1145 n.5 (Nov. 6, 1998) (stating that embryos were donated with consent of the
parents, and the inner cell masses were isolated and the stem cell lines derived therefrom).
55 National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,976-77 (Aug. 25, 2000); Text of President Bush's Speech, supra
note 13, at A12.
56 Prentice, supra note 25, at 122; see also Usala, supra note 50, at 47 ("There is little data to
support, or infer, that embryonic human stem cells have any advantages over adult stem
cells in medical research."). Congressman Dave Weldon, the lone medical doctor in the
House of Representatives, has stated that embryonic research is entirely hypothetical and
points out that the research has not even been applied to animals yet. Larry Witham,
Human Faces Put on the Stem-Cell Issue: Members of Both Parties Back, Oppose Research Funds,
THE WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2001, at A4. Weldon also challenges "anyone who makes the
assertion [that embryonic stem cells are better than adult cells] to debate me on the merits."
Id. One researcher describes stem cell research as "trial-and-error guesswork without a
fundamental understanding of what makes the cell tick." Sobel, supra note 19, at 16.
Scientists acknowledge that embryonic stem cells are "decidedly less predictable" than
adult stem cells. Gretchen Vogel, Stem Cells: New Excitement, PersistantQuestions, 290 Sci.
1672, 1672 (Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Vogel II].
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57
patients and have yielded some disastrous results in animal testing.
58
These cells are also difficult to control in the laboratory. The cells face
considerable risk of immune rejection along with the possibility that a
transplant may actually attack the host.59 Indeed, even top embryonic
researchers acknowledge that, because of immune rejection, embryonic
stem cells alone will not effectively create needed treatments; cloning is
necessary to produce the desired medical effects. 60

Prentice, supra note 25, at 112; see also Vogel II, supra note 56, at 1674. In an experiment
implanting embryonic stem cells into the brains of rats, the embryonic cells actually caused
the rats' own neural cells to die. Id. On the other hand, adult bone marrow cells have been
used to repair rat brain tissue without negative responses. See S. Ausim Azizi et al.,
Engraftment and Migration of Human Bone Marrow Stromal Cells Implanted in the Brains of
Albino Rats-Similarities to Astrocyte Grafts, 95 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SC. U.S. 3908, 3912 (Mar.
1998). In fact, one study announced that adult bone marrow stem cells used to treat mice
after induced heart attacks actually repaired the damaged heart muscle. Vogel I, supra note
17, at 1821. In another similar study, the bone marrow cells formed new heart tissue,
including muscle and blood vessels. Id. The rats receiving such treatments had
significantly less scar tissue. Id. However, when embryonic stem cells are injected into
mice, the cells form tumors. CBHD, supra note 25. In general, embryonic stem cells have a
disturbing ability to form tumors, and scientists do not know how to counteract that
tendency. Vogel I, supra note 17, at 1821. Thus, embryonic stem cells possess an
"extremely unstable state." CBHD, supra note 25.
58
Prentice, supra note 25, at 120-24. It is difficult to even keep these embryonic stem
cells alive. Vogel II, supra note 56, at 1674. In addition, embryonic stem cells are more
difficult and tedious to grow than mice stem cells. Id. Reports of pure cell populations
derived from embryonic cells are sparse. Vogel I, supra note 17, at 1822; see also Maya
Schuldiner et al., Effects of Eight Growth Factors on the Differentiation of Cells Derived from
Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. U.S. 11307, 11310 (Oct. 10, 2000)
(stating that, while embryonic stem cells have the capacity to differentiate, that
differentiation is spontaneous and unregulated).
59
Prentice, supra note 25, at 123. Since embryonic stem cells are not identical to the cells
of the patient, the patient's immune system rejects the cells. West, supra note 37, at 16.
Because the body's immune system perceives these cells as foreign, immune rejection poses
a substantial obstacle to embryonic stem cell research. Vogelstein, supra note 45, at 25;
Varmus, supra note 12, at 49; see also Schuldiner, supra note 58, at 11,307 (stating that
embryonic stem cells, when inserted into mice, were shown to form differentiated
embryonic tumors). Other sources for regenerative treatments may not face the same
obstacle. CBHD, supra note 25. For example, fetal bone marrow cells do not produce
nearly the degree of immune reaction. Id. Fetal bone marrow cells can be used to treat
adults, and adult cells can be used to treat fetuses. Id. Moreover, such fetal cells can be
obtained from spontaneously aborted fetuses. Id.
60
Okarma testimony, supra note 47, at 49. Cloning is "critical and necessary" in order
for scientists to achieve their "goals in regenerative medicine." Id. Not until such
technology is used can scientists "develop specific cells for transplantation without
immune rejection." Id. Some scientists explain that stem cells virtually have no promise
without the use of cloning to prevent rejection by patients' immune systems. Carol Ezzell,
57
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This contrasts sharply with procedures developed from adult stem
61
cell research that have already successfully treated human patients.
Such procedures facilitate the treatments of certain cancers and
autoimmune diseases, as well as the restoration of sight.62 In addition,
these cells are currently used in animal tests to treat such diseases as
diabetes and Parkinson's disease. 63 Adult stem cells also demonstrate
pluripotency. 64 Neural stem cells have been transformed into skeletal
cells as well as into all types of neural cells; 65 placenta cells have been
coaxed into nerve and muscle cells; 66 and dental pulp has been
differentiated into tooth structures. 67 Moreover, adult stem cells face no

Cloning and the Law: Will Therapeutic Cloning End Up Being Against the Law?, SCI. AM., Jan.
2002, at 51.
61 Prentice, supra note 25, at 120-22; Salley, supra note 52, at 101. "[Aldult human stem
cells to date have demonstrated at least as much efficiency as human embryonic stem cells,
and the advantages of using embryonic stem cells is only theoretical at this point in time."
Usala, supra note 50, at 47. Cord blood transplants are already used in place of bone
marrow transplants to treat children with leukemia. Salley, supra note 52, at 101. Such
cord blood is obtained from umbilical cords shortly after birth. Opportunities and
Advancements in Stein Cell Research: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 107th Cong. 41, 44 (2001) (statement of Marlene Strege,
parent of the first adopted former frozen embryo). For example, Nathan Salley, who was
diagnosed with leukemia at age eleven, required a bone marrow transplant. Salley, supra
note 52, at 100. When an exact match was not available, his physicians suggested
transplanting umbilical cord blood instead. Id. at 101. The transferred cells successfully
built an entirely new bone marrow system in Nathan's body. Id.
62 Prentice, supra note 25, at 121 (citing the treatments of brain tumors, ovarian cancer,
and breast cancers, as well as rheumatoid and juvenile arthritis, cartilage and bone
diseases, and the regeneration of corneas).
63 Id.
at 122.
64 Dale Woodbury et al., Adult Rat and Human Bone Marrow Stromal Cells Differentiate into
Neurons, 61 J. NEUROSCL REs. 364, 368-69 (May 30, 2000) (stating that adult stem cells are in
limitless supply and can be transformed into other types of cells). With the help of an
enzyme, telomerase, scientists may be able to coax stem cells to grow indefinitely, in a way
"immortalizing" adult stem cells. CBHD, supra note 25. In addition, with further research,
scientists will soon be able to coax adult stem cells into almost any cell or tissue type. Do
No Harm: The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics, Stem Cell Report: Advances in
Alternatives to Embryonic Stem Cell Research, available at http://www.stemcellresearch.org/
stemcellreport/scr-Olfall.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002). Bone marrow stem cells alone
may be able to form any other type of cell. Do No Harm: The Coalition of Americans for
Research Ethics, Scientific Problems with Using Embryonic Stem Cells (Nov. 2001), availableat
http://www.stemcellresearch.org/info/escproblems.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); Vogel
I, supra note 17, at 1821.
65 Rossella Galli et al., Skeletal Myogenic Potential of Human and Mouse Neural Stem Cells, 3
NATURE NEUROSCL 986, 986 (Oct. 2000); Stefano Pagano et al., Isolation and Characterization
of Neural Stem Cells from the Adult Human Olfactory Bulb, 18 STEM CELLs 295, 299 June 2000).
66 Prentice, supra note 25, at 116; see also Vogel I, supra note 17, at 1821.
67 S.Gronthros et al., PostnatalHuman Dental Pulp Stem Cells (DPSCs) in vitro and in vivo,
97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. U.S. 13,625, at 13,630 (Dec. 5, 2000).
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immune rejection risks, nor do they demonstrate a tendency to form
tumors. 68 A British medical journal claims that research on embryonic
cells "may soon be eclipsed by the more readily available and less
69
controversial adult stem cells."
As the science and technology involved in stem cell research grows
and improves, ethical issues arise regarding the moral status of the
embryo. 70 In response to the divergent views on the embryo's status, the
federal government is involved in regulating the growing biotech
industry. 71
B.

The Federal Ban on Funding

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Congress passed a
partial ban on funding for embryonic research. 72 Federal funds cannot
be used in research that destroys, discards, or knowingly subjects a risk
of harm or death to human embryos. 73 Under the Act, a "human
Prentice, supra note 25, at 113, 124.
69 CBHD, supra note 25. Indeed, the list of adult stem cells' potential uses could go on
and on. See Vogel I, supra note 17, at 1820-21; Vogel II, supra note 56, at 1672, 1674. Bone
marrow cells can become astrocytes and glise, which are the brain's supporting cells.
Vogel II, supra note 56, at 1672. Bone marrow cells might also be useful in treating liver
disease. Id. at 1674. Cells derived from mouse bone marrow cells have already been
coaxed into lung tissue, as well as liver, intestine, and skin cells. Vogel I, supra note 17, at
1821. Fat cells derived from liposuction can become cells resembling cartilage, bone, and
muscle. Id. at 1820. In contrast, embryonic stem cells have had relatively modest results.
Vogel II, supra note 56, at 1674.
70 Francoise Baylis, Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Comments on the NBAC Report,
in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at 51. On the one hand is the
view that "the embryo is a mere cluster of cells that has no more moral status than any
other collection of human cells." Id. There are few moral implications in using such a
collection of human cells. Id. at 52. On the other hand is the view that "embryos should be
considered in the same moral category as children or adults." Id. As such, it would be
totally unethical to destroy embryos. Id. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission
(NBAC) states that these divergent views are totally irreconcilable. Id. at 51-52. Because of
the extreme position of these views, there is no middle ground. Id.
71 See infra Part II.B.
7
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 510(a), 112 Stat. 2763,
2763A-71 (2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b)).
73 Id. The Act applies to both embryonic and fetal stem cell research. Id. Federal funds
may not be used for the creation of embryos for research purposes. Id. Section 510(a)
provides:
None of the funds made available in this Act may be used for (1) the
creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or (2)
research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed,
discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater
than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R.
68
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embryo" is any organism derived by fertilization from human gamete or
diploid cells. 74 The Act uses a standard already codified for determining
the risk of injury. 75 First, research can be conducted only when "the risk
to the fetus imposed by the research is minimal and the purpose of the
activity is the development of important biomedical knowledge which
cannot be obtained by other means." 76 "Minimal risks" occur when "the
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical
or psychological examinations or tests." 77 In addition, the standard of
risk to embryos is the same as that "for fetuses which are intended to be
aborted and fetuses which are intended to be carried to term."78 These
regulations apply to all grants and contracts made by the Department of
Health and Human Services. 79 Thus, federally funded researchers
cannot destroy or discard embryos or perform experiments that will
80
impose a greater than minimal risk of harm.
In August 2000, the National Institutes of Health released its
Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells
("Guidelines"). 81 According to the Guidelines, federal funds may be

46.208(a)(2) and section 498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 289g(b)).
Id.
74

Id. Section 510(b) provides:
For purposes of this section, the term "human embryo or embryos"
includes any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45 CFR
46 as of the date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by
fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means of one or
more human gametes or human diploid cells.

Id.
75

Id.
45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(2) (2000).
77 Id. § 46.102(i) (2000).
78 42 U.S.C. § 289g(b) (2000).
79 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (2000).
80
See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 510(a).
81
National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000). The National Institutes of Health ("NIH")
highlighted several reasons for its decisions in promulgating the Guidelines. Id. The NIH
claims that adult stem cells do not have the promise that embryonic stem cells possess, as
adult stem cells have not yet been found for all tissue types. Id. For example, the agency
stated that cardiac stem cells have not yet been identified. Id. The NIH also claims that
adult stem cells are only present in small quantities and are difficult to isolate. Id. Yet
another NIH claim is that stem cells derived from adults with genetic disorders will also
carry genetic errors. Id. Because of advances in adult stem cell research, however, such
76
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used for research on stem cells derived from embryos that are "in excess
of clinical need" and created for fertility treatment purposes. 82 However,
funds may not be used in the actual derivation of the stem cells from the
embryos. 83 Even so, research on stem cells after derivation from
embryos is considered ethically acceptable because the cells are no
longer embryos.8 4 Thus, federal money may not be used to destroy

claims appear outdated or incorrect. Adams, supra note 40, at 116 n.56 (stating that
"substantial evidence" contradicts the NIH's claims); Do No Harm: The Coalition of
Americans for Research Ethics, Adult Stem Cell Shown to have Same Versatility Once Claimed
only for Embryonic Stem Cells (June 20, 2002), available at http://www.stemcelresearch.org/
pr/pr020620.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2002). See generally Prentice, supra note 25; Usala,
supra note 50; CBHD, supra note 25; supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text (discussing
adult and embryonic stem cells). Thus, several of the factors upon which the NIH
constructed its Guidelines may no longer be adequate to support its reasoning. Do No
Harm, supra. See generally Prentice, supra note 25; Usala, supra note 50; CBHD, supra note
25.
82 National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,979. The NIH neglected to consider one "clinical need," however.
Parents of "spare embryos" now have the option of embryo adoption. See Davidson, supra
note 12, at 75. Many genetic parents, those who created embryos through the IVF process,
are emotionally invested in their embryos, making destruction or donation to research
unappealing. Id. On the other hand, embryo adoption offers benefits to both the genetic
parents and the infertile adopting parents. Id. at 75-76. The genetic parents usually pick
the adopting parents in an open adoption, which is more psychologically rewarding than
closed adoptions. Id. at 76. Embryo adoption also includes a thorough home study, which
ensures genetic parents that their children are placed in stable family environments. Id. In
addition, the adopting parents obtain the experiences of pregnancy, prenatal bonding, and
childbirth that are not obtained through regular adoptions. Id. The home study also
ensures that the embryos received are not paternally related, which is a problem with
donor facilities. Id. Embryonic adoption is also much less expensive than IVF, with the
average adoption costing between 7,000 and 10,000 dollars. Id. IVF, however, generally
costs over 50,000 dollars. Id. One agency, the Snowflake Embryo Adoption Agency, has
doubled its embryonic adoption every year since its start and has increased its embryo
adoptions by over 600%. Id. at 78. The "clinical need" for these embryos is obvious. See id.
In 1999, the conservative estimate of frozen embryos was 188,000. Id. Approximately 50%
of the frozen embryos die during the thawing process. Id. In addition, for women under
thirty-five years of age, the national birth rate for IVF is 37.2%. Id. For women over forty
years of age, the birth rate sinks to 13.4%. Id. Thus, approximately 12,600 to 35,000
children could be born from these 188,000 embryos. Id. With infertility affecting 6.5 to 10
million couples in the United States alone, the "clinical need" for these embryos is
staggering. Id. This need also negates the common argument, which is echoed throughout
Congress and the media, that the frozen embryos "will just be destroyed, anyway," if not
used for research. C. Ben Mitchell, NIH, Stem Cells, and Moral Guilt (Aug. 24, 2000), available
at http://www.cbhd.org/resources (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); see also Rubin, supra note 13,
at 2A (stating that the demand for embryos greatly outstrips the supply).
83 National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem
Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,979.
84 On Human Embryos and Medical Research: An Appeal for Ethically Responsible Science and
Public Policy, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 261, 266 (2001). This claim, however, is now being
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embryos by pulling out the stem cells but may be used on the fruits of
85
destruction already performed through private funding.
In 2001, Congress considered several bills on stem cell research. 86 On
87
April 5, 2001, the Stem Cell Research Act was introduced in the Senate.
The purpose was to "provide for human embryonic stem cell generation
and research." 88 If passed, the Act would allow research only on cells
derived from embryos donated from IVF clinics. 89 An identical bill was
introduced in the House of Representatives on June 5, 2001.90 Neither
version mandated embryonic stem cell research as a right, but merely
provided the funding for those scientists desiring to perform the
research. 91
Another Act, the Responsible Stem Cell Research Act, was
introduced in both the House and Senate in the summer of 2001.92 This

challenged, as an embryonic stem cell may possess the ability to grow back into an embryo.
CBHD, supra note 25. If such studies reveal that stem cells really do develop back into
human embryos, then "research on such stem cells could itself involve the creation and/or
destruction of human life and would thereby certainly fall under the existing ban on
federally-funded embryo research." Id.
85
See National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent
Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,979. The federal funding of stem cell research on cells
harvested by private firms is viewed as a mere "loophole" in the law. Nelle S. Paegel,
Note, Use of Stem Cells in Biotechnological Research, 22 WHITrIER L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2001).
86
See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. However, due to the national tragedy on
September 11, 2001, these bills were placed on hold. Adams, supra note 40, at 123.
87
S. 723, 107th Cong. (2001). Senator Specter introduced the bill along with Senators
Harkin, Thurmond, Chafee, Smith of Oregon, Hollings, Reid, Murray, Clinton, Corzine,
Feinstein, Kerry, and Inouye. Id. The bill was read twice and then referred to the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions but went no further. Id.; see also Bill
Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bill Summary & Status].
88
S.723. The Act would amend the Public Health Service Act, located at 42 U.S.C. § 289,
by adding § 498c. Id.
89
Id. Additional requirements included that the embryos were never going to be
implanted into a woman and that the embryos were donated with the written informed
consent of the progenitors. Id. § 498c(b)(1). In addition, the Act prohibited research on the
embryos that resulted in the creation of human embryos or reproductive cloning. Id.
§ 498c(c)(1)(B).
90
H.R. 2059, 107th Cong. (2001). Congressman McDermott introduced the bill. Id. The
bill was referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and then to the
Subcommittee on Health. Id. No further action was taken. See Bill Summary & Status, supra
note 87.
91
See H.R. 2059; S.723.
92
H.R. 2096, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1349, 107th Cong. (2001). In the House of
Representatives, Congressman Chris Smith and thirty-eight others introduced the bill.
H.R. 2096. The bill was subsequently referred to the House Committee on Energy and
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Act called for the creation of a National Stem Cell Donor Bank for human
stem cells.9 3 The Act would not allow the Bank to house embryonic stem
cells. 94 Both versions of this bill appropriated funds for the creation of
95
the Bank and subsequent adult stem cell research.
In August 2001, President George W. Bush announced that federal
funds cannot be used to harvest stem cells from embryos. 96 However,
funds may support research with stem cell lines developed before his
August announcement. 97 President Bush's decision seemed to create a
"happy medium" between the pro-life opponents, who were grateful
that no more embryos would be destroyed, and the embryonic research
supporters, who were encouraged to continue research on the available
stem cell lines. 98
Yet at the heart of all these laws and decisions, the question still
rings: what is the moral status of the embryo?99 The United States Supreme

Commerce, which in turn referred it to the Subcommittee on Health. See Bill Summary &
Status, supra note 87. The bill went no further. See id. In the Senate, the bill was introduced
by Senators Ensign and Brownback. S.1349. After reading the bill twice and referring it to
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Senate took no further
action on the bill. See Bill Summary & Status, supranote 87.
93 H.R. 2096; S.1349. Human stem cells are cells obtained from placentas, umbilical cord
blood, organs, and tissues. H.R. 2096 § 3(b); S.1349 § 3(b). The Donor Bank would then
make the cells available for biomedial research and therapeutic purposes. H.R. 2096 § 3(a);
S. 1349. Unlike the Stem Cell Research Act, the Responsible Stem Cell Research Act
provided that the Donor Bank would actively seek donors, as well as establish donor
criteria to protect both the donors and the transplant recipients and to prevent the
transmission of disease. H.R. 2096 § 3(c); S.1349.
SA See H.R. 2096; S.1349.
95 H.R. 2096 § 4(b); S.1349 § 4(b).
% Ezzell, supra note 60, at 51. The Administration effectively withdrew the portions of
the NIH's Guidelines that were inconsistent with the President's announced policy.
Adams, supra note 40, at 114.
97 Ezzell, supranote 60, at 51.
98 Justin Gillis & Ceci Connolly, Bush Policy on Stein Cells Appears Safe on Hill, THE WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2001, at A15. Proponents of embryonic stem cell research question whether
the cell lines will be as helpful as the Bush administration asserts but are satisfied that some
research will continue. Id. Alternatively, opponents of the research are displeased that the
research is not completely prohibited but are content that the President's plan discourages
more destruction. Id.
99 Baylis, supra note 70, at 52; see also Adams, supra note 40, at 111 ("The debate about
whether to federally fund human embryonic stem cell research is at root a controversy
about the legal status that should be accorded the human embryo."). Even those
supporting embryonic research acknowledge that "there is a wide consensus that embryos
deserve 'special respect' because they have completed the first steps after fertilization
toward becoming a newborn child." John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of
Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 515 (1990).
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Court has never answered this question. 100 However, the Court's
decisions on abortion, privacy, and the state's interest in potential life
provide some guidance. 101
C. Abortion: Privacy and the State's Interest in Potential Life
A number of legal issues arise in the stem cell debate, including
privacy and the state interest in protecting potential life. The Supreme
Court has addressed these issues in cases overruling state abortion
statutes. 02 In Roe v. Wade,' 03 the Court framed the right to terminate a
pregnancy as a privacy right.104 Although acknowledging that the right
of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Court
10 6
105
stated that such a right can be found in the First, Fourth, and Fifth'07

100 See Andrews, supra note 14, at B1. The United States is not the only nation grappling
with the stem cell issue. See G.V., Stem Cell Scorecard, 290 Sci. 1673 (Dec. 1, 2000). In Japan,
the Council for Science and Technology is expected to release guidelines governing the use
of stem cells. Id. Until that time, scientists are not allowed to derive or even work with
embryonic stem cells. Id. In Germany, scientists may not perform any research that harms
embryos. Id. However, that prohibition does not extend to research on imported stem cell
lines. Id. In Australia, the policies relating to stem cell research vary from state to state. Id.
For example, the State of Victoria prohibits the derivation of embryonic stem cells, while
other states do not. Id. The European Union backs all types of stem cell research but
particularly pushes research on adult stem cells. Id.
101

See infra Part II.C.

See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102

103

410 U.S. at 113.

Id. at 153. "The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most
central principle of Roe v. Wade." Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
105 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendments declares that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
106 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
107 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
104
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Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, 108 and in the
concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment. 109 As structured by the
Court, a woman's privacy interests in terminating pregnancy revolve
around the physical and emotional effects of the pregnancy. 110 However,
privacy is not an unqualified, absolute right, and at some point the state
interest in protecting prenatal life trumps the privacy interests of the
mother.1"
In Roe, the Court acknowledged that the State of Texas possessed an
important and legitimate interest in protecting potential life.11 2 The
Court viewed this interest as "separate and distinct" from the interest in
protecting the health of the mother. 113 Concluding that each interest
becomes compelling at some point during pregnancy, the Court found
that the State's interest in protecting potential life begins at viability.114

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
Id.
108 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
109
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The right of privacy also
extends in some respect to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
110 Id. at 153. The Court spelled out the maternal interests in competition with the state
interest. Id. For example, there may be specific and direct medical harm, as well as
psychological harm, associated with the pregnancy. Id. Maternity may force the woman
into a "distressful life and future." Id. Caring for children may "tax" the mother mentally
and physically. Id. The Court also recognized that there is stress involved in an unwanted
pregnancy and that "there is a problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it." Id. Finally, the Court acknowledged the
mother's interest in avoiding the stigma of unwed motherhood. Id.
1
Id. at 154, 155. The Court stated,
[1It is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some
point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of
potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's
privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly.
Id. at 159 (emphasis added). Thus, these state interests become dominant at some point
during pregnancy. Id. at 155. Other state interests include safeguarding health and
maintaining medical standards. Id. at 154.
112
Id. at 162.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 163. Viability is the point at which the fetus is capable of maintaining a
"meaningful life" outside of the womb. Id. The Court proliferated a trimester framework
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The Court affirmed this decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.115
The plurality maintained that the state has a legitimate interest from the
very beginning of a pregnancy to protect potential life.116 Quoting from
Roe that the state has an "important and legitimate interest in potential
life," the Court noted that the state interest had not been recognized nor
implemented enough in judicial decisions. 117 The Court replaced the
trimester framework in Roe with the "undue burden" standard, claiming
that the trimester framework undervalued the state's interest in potential
life and did not fulfill Roe's promise that a state has an interest in the
protection of life.11 8 The Court then recognized that the state has a
substantial interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.19
20
The most recent Supreme Court decision is Stenberg v. Carhart,1
where the Court struck down a Nebraska statute banning "partial birth
abortion." 12' The Court affirmed both Roe and Casey, stating that before

for determining the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion. Id. at 164. During
the first trimester, the decision to have an abortion must be left to the woman and her
physician, and the state can in no way interfere. Id. The state can regulate abortion
procedures to an extent during the second trimester, so long as it is in the interest of the
health of the mother. Id. During the third trimester, after viability, the state may regulate
abortion in the interest of potential human life. Id. at 164-65.
115 505 U.S. 833, 864, 869 (1992). The Court saw Roe as a "rule ... of personal autonomy
and bodily integrity" and recognized that it is a "constitutional liberty" for a woman to
have some freedom to have an abortion. Id. at 857, 869. However, the Court did reject the
trimester framework set forth in Roe. Id. at 873. Instead, "[o]nly where state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the
State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 874.
Thus, the Court replaced the trimester framework with the "undue burden" standard. Id.
at 873-74.
116

Id. at 846.

Id. at 871. The Court stated that many decisions after Roe went too far, striking down
regulations "which in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision." Id. at 875.
These decisions did not reflect that "[niot all governmental intrusion is of necessity
unwarranted .
I..."
Id.; see also Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 908, 912 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002)
(stating that it is "not clear to what extent the framework [in Roe] has ever bound this court
in its abortion decisions").
11s Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76.
19 Id. at 876. The Court stated,
Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental attempts to influence
a woman's decision on behalf of the potential life within her as
unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with
the recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy.
Id.
120 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
117

121

Id. at 922.
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viability, the woman has a right to terminate pregnancy. 122 After
viability, the state has an interest in the life and health of the mother and
potential child.123 The Court held the Nebraska statute unconstitutional
for two reasons. 124 First, the statute did not contain an exception "for the
preservation of the ...health of the mother." 125 Second, the statute
imposed "an undue burden on a woman's ability to choose [a certain
type] of abortion." 126 While not at the crux of the stem cell debate, these
Supreme Court decisions have somewhat influenced the lower courts in
127
evaluating the constitutionality of state bans on embryonic research.
D. Unconstitutional State Bans on Fetal and Embryonic Research
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of state
bans on fetal and embryonic research. 128 In the last fifteen years, the
lower courts have struck down only three state statutes prohibiting
experimentation on fetuses. 129 There were two reasons for striking down
these laws. 130
The main reason was that the statutes were

122

Id.

123 Id. Quoting Casey and Roe, the Court stated,

[Slubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 921.
124
125

Id. at 929-30
Id. at 930.

126 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
127 See infra Part II.D.

128 See Andrews, supra note 14, at B1.
129 See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that Utah's ban on fetal
experimentation was unconstitutionally vague), rev'd. on other grounds sub non. Leavitt v.
Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (holding that a provision regulating abortion up to twenty
weeks gestation was unconstitutional but that a different provision regulating abortion was
constitutional and severable); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding unconstitutionally vague Louisiana's criminal statute prohibiting experimentation
on an unborn child or child born as a result of abortion); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp.
1361, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that an Illinois law prohibiting experimentation violated
due process because of vagueness). The courts have also upheld statutes prohibiting
experimentation. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 638 (W.D. Ky. 1974), affd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding a Kentucky
statute prohibiting the experimentation on viable fetuses).
130 See generally supranote 129.
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unconstitutionally vague.131 A secondary issue regarded interests of the
parties involved.132
With aggressive regulations on the use of embryos and embryonic
research, Louisiana prohibited experimentation on both unborn children
and children born after an abortion, unless such experimentation was
therapeutic to the child. 133 An "unborn child" was defined as existing
from the moment of conception.'34 Thus, experimentation on embryos
135
was prohibited.
In 1986, the Fifth Circuit struck down Louisiana's law prohibiting
experimentation on unborn children in Margaret S. v. Edwards.136 The
court stated that a statute failing to specify a standard of conduct
137
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Focusing on the word "experiment," the court concluded that the statute

131 See generally supranote 129.
132 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376.
133 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West 2001). This statute states: "No person...
shall experiment on an unborn child or on a child born as the result of an abortion, whether
the unborn child or child is alive or dead, unless the experimentation is therapeutic to the
unborn child or child." Id. Many other Louisiana statutes concern a variety of embryonic
issues. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 2000) (stating that a "human embryo" is
a human ovum created through IVF); Id. § 9:122 (stating that no in vitro fertilized ovum can
be farmed or cultured solely for research purposes); Id. § 9:123 (stating that an in vitro
fertilized ovum is a juridical person until it is implanted in the womb); Id. § 9:124 (stating
that as a juridical person, an in vitro fertilized ovum is to be given an identification, which
entitles it to sue or be sued); Id. § 9:125 (stating that an in vitro fertilized human ovum is
"recognized as a separate entity apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is housed
or stored"); Id. § 9:129 (stating that a viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical
person who cannot be intentionally destroyed through the actions of any other person and
implying that an embryo in the state of cryopreservation is viable); Id. § 9:130 (stating that
if the IVF parents renounce their parental rights, the embryos are available for adoption);
Id. § 9:131 (stating that in disputes regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the standard to
use in resolving the disputes is "the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum"); see also id.
§ 9:126, which states that the "in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being
[and] is not the property of the physician," the facility in which it resides, or the donors of
the egg and sperm. Id. If the donors express their identity as parents, then their rights as
parents are preserved. Id. However, if the donors fail to express their identity as parents,
the physician becomes a temporary guardian until the embryo is adopted. Id.
134 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.1(2). The statute states that an unborn child is "the
unborn offspring of human beings from the moment of conception through pregnancy and
until termination of the pregnancy." Id.
135 Id.; Id. § 40:1299.35.13.
136 794 F.2d 994, 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1986).
137 Id.; see also Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that a statute is
unconstitutionally vague if "inherently standardless, enforceable only on the exercise of an
unlimited, and hence arbitrary, discretion vested in the state").
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was vague because a physician would not be able to distinguish whether
a procedure was an "experiment" or a "test" and would, therefore, be
held to a standardless prohibition. 138 For example, one witness pointed
out that all standard tests were at one time experiments. 139 The court
noted that, because "tests" and "experiments" may overlap, even some
treatments may fall into the broad category of
medical
Thus, the court concluded that the difference
experimentation. 40
between a medical experiment and a medical test was "almost
meaningless." 141 However, the court hypothesized that the legislative
reasoning for the statute was to remove any incentives for "researchminded physicians" to promote abortion. 42 The court then noted that
43
the statute was "rationally related to an important state interest."
Therefore, the court acknowledged that a state's interest in removing
incentives to promote abortions is an important governmental interest. 144
The court also indicated that Louisiana did have the power to regulate
medical experimentation and that a statute with more clearly defined
145
terms may have resulted in a different conclusion.
Illinois also promulgated a law prohibiting nontherapeutic
experimentation on fetuses. 1 46 Because the statute did not define the

138 Margaret S., 794 F.2d at 999.
139 Id. Every medical test becomes "standard" through a gradual process of observing
results, confirming benefits, and modifying techniques. Id. The witness added,
[W]e have at one end things that are obviously standard tests and [at]
the other end things that are complete experimentation. But in the
center there is a very broad area where diagnostic procedures of
testing types overlap with experimentation procedures.
Id. (alteration in original).
140
Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 998 n.11.
143 Id.
144

Id.

145 Id. at 999 n.13. The court stated,
This of course does not imply that the states are powerless to regulate
medical experimentation. Because of the nature of the vagueness
doctrine, any holding that a statute is unconstitutionally vague must
A statute using more precise
necessarily be highly case-specific.
language than that used in R.S. 40:1299.35.13, whether it applied to
fetal experimentation or other forms of medical research, would
present a different case than the one we decided today.
Id.
146 See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Chapter 38, § 6(7) of
the Illinois Revised Statutes provided:
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147
terms "experiment" and "therapeutic," the court in Lifchez v. Hartigan
stated that it failed to "alert persons of common intelligence to what
conduct is unlawful." 148 Consequently, it was held unconstitutionally
149
vague.

The court in Lifchez noted that there were four possible
150
interpretations of the word "experiment" as used in the Illinois statute.
One possible interpretation was where the subject being experimented
upon gains no direct benefit and the scientist does the research merely to
increase his own knowledge. 51 Another possibility was any procedure
that has not been exhaustively tested to reach a predictable status.15 2 In
addition, a procedure can be experimental when a particular physician
performs it for the first time.153 The last interpretation included any
medical treatment where a physician takes what he learns in one
procedure and applies it to the next.154 Because the statute did not
indicate which definition of experimentation applied, enforcement

No person shall sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the
fertilization of a human ovum by a human sperm unless such
experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced.
Intentional violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Nothing in this subsection (7) is intended to prohibit the performance
of in vitro fertilization.
Id. at 1363. The court in Lifchez stated that the term "embryo" was included in the
legislature's use of "fetus." Id. at 1368. The court noted that "legislators and courts
commonly-and incorrectly-elide" the terms fetus and embryo. Id.
147 Id. at 1363.
148 Id. at 1376. The court stated that not only did the vague terms make it difficult for a
physician to determine what conduct is lawful, but the terms also created a situation where
the interests of the woman and the embryo may be competing for therapy from a
physician. Id. at 1370.
149

Id.

150 Id. at 1364-65; see infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
151 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1365. The State had characterized such experimentation as
"just for the scientific thrill" of it. Id.
152 Id. This is the definition typically used by insurance companies when denying
coverage for unrecognized procedures. Id.
153 Id. The court noted that the third definition was the definition used by the American
Fertility Society. Id.
154 Id. The court analogized this definition of experimentation with that utilized in the
federal regulations. Id. According to the federal regulations, "research" is defined as a
"systematic investigation ... designed to develop or contribute to generalizeable
knowledge." Id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2000). Such research includes research
development, testing, and evaluation. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d).
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officials did not have a clear standard of what procedures were
1 55
unlawful.
Other aspects of the statute also concerned the court. 156 Because an
experiment may at some point become a routine procedure, the mere
1 57
passage of time may change an action from being unlawful to lawful.
The court stated that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if the mere
passage of time may change the legality of a procedure.158 In addition,
15 9
the court noted concerns about the privacy interests of the women.
Because the statute may intrude upon procedures such as embryo
transfer and chorionic villi sampling, the court ruled that the statute
impermissibly restricted a woman's fundamental right of privacy and
her right to make decisions free from governmental interference. 16°
In addition, the statute contained a scienter requirement, stating that
only intentional violations of the statute would result in a misdemeanor
conviction.1 61 Thus, physicians who did not realize they were breaking a
law would not be convicted under the statute.1 62 But the court held that
a scienter requirement does not mitigate vagueness problems when a
statute has "no core meaning" from the start.163

Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1365. The court stated that it was hard to know where, along
the broad spectrum of possible meanings for "experiment," to fit the procedures performed
by the doctors in the case. Id.
156 Id. at 1367, 1376.
157
Id. at 1367.
155

158

Id.

Id. at 1376. In particular, the court noted a woman's fundamental privacy right to
"make reproductive choices free of governmental interference with those choices," and,
more specifically, the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child. Id.
160 Id. at 1367-68. Embryo transfer can be used to help infertile women become pregnant.
Id. at 1367. The procedure involves removing the embryo from the uterus of one woman
and implanting it in the infertile woman. Id. Chorionic villi sampling involves taking a
biopsy by snipping off some of the tissue surrounding the embryo. Id. The process
provides genetic information about the fetus to the pregnant mother. Id. Because these
procedures can be perceived as nontherapeutic to the embryo, the court concluded that
such procedures would violate the Illinois statute as it stood. Id.
161 Id. at 1372. "Scienter" is defined as "[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person
legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1347 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, in order for a person to be subject to civil or
criminal punishment, a "scienter requirement" demands that an act is done knowingly. Id.;
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1372.
162 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1372.
163 Id. A statute has "no core meaning" when a specific standard of conduct is not
specified. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986). In Smith v. Goguen, the
court specified two different types of vagueness. 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974). In one sense, a
159
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The court highlighted three ways in which vagueness violates due
process. 164 First, a vague statute does not give a person notice of exactly
what conduct is unlawful. 165 Second, a lack of definite terms allows for
arbitrary and capricious enforcement. 66 Finally, undefined unlawful
conduct and the possibility of arbitrary enforcement invites a chilling
167
effect because people will curtail lawful conduct to avoid facing arrest.
A third statute involving embryonic experimentation was struck
down in Utah. 168 The statute prohibited experimentation on "live
unborn children" unless used to detect genetic defects. 169 In Jane L. v.
Bangerter17 0 the court held that a number of words and phrases used in
the statute were unconstitutionally vague, including "experiment" and
"experimentation." 1 71 The statute did not clearly differentiate between
lawful and unlawful conduct, making it difficult for physicians to know
what procedures they could lawfully perform. 7 2 Again, this undefined
unlawful activity could cause a chilling effect as physicians abstain from
73
otherwise lawful procedures in order to avoid possible liability.

statute is vague if "it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
comprehensible" standard. Id. (quoting Coats v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614
(1971)). On the other hand, a statute is vague if there is not a standard of conduct specified
at all. Id. It is in the latter that courts have found "no core meaning." Id. Such an "absence
of any ascertainable standard ... is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause." Id.; see
also Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law").
164

Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.

165

Id.

166 Id. For example, "statutory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Smith, 415 U.S. at 575.
167 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364. When a statute is unclear, such ambiguity will cause
people to stay farther from the unlawful zone than they would if the unlawful activity was
clearly marked. Id.
168 Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (holding that a provision regulating abortion up to
twenty weeks gestation was unconstitutional but that a different provision regulating
abortion was constitutional and severable).
169 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1999). Section 76-7-310 states: "Live unborn children
may not be used for experimentation, but when advisable, in the best medical judgment of
the physician, may be tested for genetic defects." Id.
170 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
171
172

Id. at 1501-02.
Id. at 1502.

173

Id.
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The court provided two standards to employ when determining
vagueness. 7 4 First, a law must give a person "of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." 175 Here, the
undefined terms made it nearly impossible for physicians to differentiate
between conduct that was prohibited and that which was not.176 Second,
a law must include exact standards of enforcement. 177 Otherwise, the
power of enforcement delegated to policemen, judges, and juries will be
completely subjective and result in arbitrary and discriminatory
application of the law. 178
In addition to the interests of the state and the mother, those in the
medical profession have asserted an interest in the performing of
research. 179 One court decision, while upholding a statute on fetal
experimentation, directly addressed the medical field's claimed
constitutional right to perform fetal research. 180 In Wynn v. Scott,18 1 the
court considered another Illinois law aimed at experimentation on
fetuses aborted alive.18 2 The court stated that a statute prohibiting such
experimentation did not burden the mother involved, nor did it place an
obstacle in the path of obtaining the abortion.183 Instead, the contested
provision was within the state's broad police power.184 Thus, the court

174 Id. at 1500. The court also noted that different standards are used depending on the
type of statute involved. Id. If a statute imposes a civil penalty, it is unconstitutionally
vague only when it is "vague in all of its applications." Id. If a statute imposes a criminal
penalty, it is unconstitutionally vague "even when it could conceivably have had some
valid application." Id. Crninal statutes are invalid when the average person is not aware
that conduct is unlawful. Id.
175 Id.
176

Id.

177

Id.

Id.
179 See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599
F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
180 Id.
178

181

Id.

182 Id. at 1322. The Illinois statute stated:
No person shall use any fetus or premature infant aborted alive for any
type of scientific, research, laboratory or other kind of experimentation
either prior to or subsequent to any abortion procedure except as
necessary to protect or preserve the life and health of such premature
infant aborted alive.
Id. (citing § 6(3) of the Illinois Abortion Act of 1975).
183
Id.
184 Id. The court stated that the contested provisions of the statute were "within the
category of social and health matters which states are given broad latitude to regulate." Id.
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concluded that the provision did not infringe a constitutional right.18 5 In
addition, the court stated that medical researchers do not have
186
fundamental rights under the Constitution to perform research.
Because no fundamental rights were involved, the state merely had to
possess a rational connection between its asserted interest and the
regulation. 187 This court's holding, along with the holdings in Margaret
S.,188 Lifchez, 189 and Jane L.,190 work together to create standards for
analyzing the potential vagueness problems of current state laws
banning embryonic experimentation.
III.

EVALUATING CURRENT STATE STATUTES BANNING EMBRYONIC
EXPERIMENTATION

Several states still uphold laws banning or regulating embryonic
research. 191 A number of factors must be considered in evaluating the
constitutionality of these statutes. This Part will first set forth a
framework for analyzing these current statutes, based on the standards
created through the Supreme Court and lower court decisions discussed

Id.
Id. It is still argued, however, that research is "rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked fundamental." Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional
Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 696 (2000).
187
Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1322. The court ruled that a rational connection did exist
between the regulation and the state's interest. Id.
188
See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-67 and accompanying text.
189
See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
190
191
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(6) (West 2002) (banning the use of any live fetus "for
any type of scientific, research, laboratory, or other kind of experimentation"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2000) (prohibiting the destruction of any in vitro fertilized human
ovum); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992) (stating that the use of intrauterine
and extrauterine human fetuses or products of conception cannot be used for scientific or
any form of experimentation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001) (prohibiting
research on embryos if the research will substantially jeopardize the life or health of the
embryo); MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (1998) (stating that anyone who uses a living human
conceptus for experimentation that is not harmless to the embryo is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-3 (Michie 2000) (stating that a fetus cannot be
used for clinical research unless "the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of
the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent
necessary to meet such needs or no significant risk to the fetus is imposed by the research
activity"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216 (2000) (stating that "any person who knowingly
performs any type of nontherapeutic experimentation or nontherapeutic medical
procedure" upon an unborn child is guilty of a third-degree felony and defining
"nontherapeutic" as "that which is not intended to preserve the life or health of the child
upon whom it is performed").
185
186
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in Part 11.192 Next, this Part will evaluate the state laws that ban or
93
regulate embryonic research.
A. A Frameworkfor Evaluating State Statutes
Through their rulings on abortion and fetal experimentation statutes,
the courts have established a framework through which to evaluate the
constitutionality of state bans on embryonic research.194 Thus far, the
statutes have only been struck down based on the impinged privacy
195
interest of the mother or on vagueness grounds.
The first consideration when analyzing a state statute is the interests
of the parties involved. In the Supreme Court cases, the Court balanced
the mother's privacy interest against the state's interest in potential
life.1 96 As stated in the Court's decisions, the mother's privacy interests
deal only with the physical and mental aspects of pregnancy.1 97 In Roe,
98
the mother's right was framed as the right to terminate pregnancy.
Casey emphasized that the main principle in Roe was the right to end
pregnancy and saw it as a rule "of personal autonomy and bodily
integrity." 199 The mother's interests in obtaining an abortion also
included the distress associated with an unwanted child and the stigma
of unwed motherhood. 20 0 Again, these interests involved the physical
The medical
and emotional aspects of the mother's pregnancy.
definition of "pregnancy" involves only an embryo or fetus within the
body of the mother. 20 1 Stem cell research, however, does not involve

192
193
194
195
196

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part III.A.
infra Part III.B.
supraPart II.C-D.
supraPart I.D.
supraPart II.C.

197 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857, 871 (1992); supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
198 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The right of privacy was viewed as "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 908, 912 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that
the essential holding in Roe was a recognition of a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion, with this right resting at least in part on the woman's interest in selfdetermination and the effect pregnancy has upon the woman).
199 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857, 871.
200 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also supra note 110.
201 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1730 (19th ed. 2001).

Pregnancy is

medically defined as the "condition of having a developing embryo or fetus in the body
after successful conception." Id.
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pregnancy. 2 2 Thus, because the privacy interests asserted in Roe revolve
around pregnancy and the mother's physical interests are not present in
the stem cell debate, these interests cannot be factored into the balance
against the state interest when evaluating the constitutionality of bans on
embryonic research. 203
The cases following Roe reiterate this analysis. Under Casey, a
mother has a privacy interest in obtaining an abortion without undue
burden.2°4 The state cannot place an undue burden, or substantial
obstacle, in the path of a woman wanting an abortion. 20 5 Stenberg
extended the interpretation in Casey of "substantial obstacles" to include
a woman's right to choose a particular type of abortion. 20 6 These types of

202 Casey, supra note 6, at 151 n.8. Again, the embryos used for stem cell research were

fertilized in laboratories, outside of the mothers' bodies. Id.; see also supra notes 7-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the IVF procedure).
203 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. See also Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. 111.1978) affd
sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a statute aimed at fetal
experimentation did not place an obstacle in the path of obtaining an abortion and claiming
that such a regulation is within a state's police powers); Adams, supra note 40, at 118-19
("[Elven strong pro-abortion proponents acknowledge that Roe v. Wade has no necessary
bearing upon the ex utero living human embryo where maternal and fetal rights are not in
opposition.").
204 Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76.
205

Id. at 877.

206 Stenberg v. Carhart, 503 U.S. 914, 930 (2000). In Stenberg, the Court struck down a
Nebraska partial-birth abortion statute. Id. at 922. The Court used three principles in
deciding the case. Id. at 921. The first was that a woman has the right to terminate
pregnancy before viability. Id. The second was that laws imposing undue burdens on the
woman's decision before viability are unconstitutional. Id. The third was that after
viability, states can regulate and even proscribe abortions when necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother. Id. The Court ruled the statute unconstitutional because it
lacked an exception "for the preservation of the ... health of the mother" and because it
imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose a particular abortion procedure.
Id. at 930. The Court seemed to rest much of its analysis on the fact that the partial-birth
abortions were viewed as safer than other procedures. Id. at 932. In other words, the
mother's main interest was physical safety. Id. Thus, like in Roe, the Court designated the
mother's main interest in abortion as physical. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The particular
procedure in question, partial-birth abortion, was claimed to be a safer abortion because it
"reduces operating time, blood loss and risk of infection; reduces complications from bony
fragments; reduces instrument-inflicted damage to the uterus and cervix; prevents the most
common causes of maternal mortality (DIC and amniotic fluid loss); and eliminates the
possibility of 'horrible complications' arising from retained fetal parts." Stenberg, 503 U.S.
at 932. Yet these health interests are not present with embryonic experimentation. See
supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text (discussing the VF procedure). In fact, the
physical health and safety of the mother is not an interest at all. See supra notes 197-203 and
accompanying text.
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obstacles once more involve the mother's physical and health interests,
which are not present with stem cell research.
In contrast, the state's interest in protecting human life is present in
both abortion cases and in the stem cell research debate. In Roe, the Court
claimed that the state does have an important and legitimate interest in
protecting human life and that at some point this interest becomes
compelling. 207 The Court also held that there is a state interest in
maintaining medical standards. 208 In Casey, the Court extended Roe by
stating that the state has a substantial interest in potential life from the
time of conception until birth.2° 9 Unlike the mother's interests, the state's
interests are both acknowledged by the Court and apply to the stem cell
debate. 210 The state has an interest in potential life from the moment of
conception, whether that conception takes place inside a woman's body
211
or in a laboratory.
Another aspect of stem cell research not present in the abortion
decisions involves the interests of scientists in conducting
experimentation on embryos. Roe found only personal privacy rights

27 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. The Court declared that "it is reasonable and appropriate for a
State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of the health of the mother
or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved." Id. at 159. At that point,
the woman's privacy right is no longer sole and will not weigh as heavily against the state's
interest in life. Id. Thus, the right of privacy is not absolute. Id. at 154.
208 Id. at 154. The state's interests in regulation are important and should be weighed
accordingly. Id. The Court acknowledged that some state regulation in the area protected
by the right of privacy is appropriate. Id. A state can "assert important interests in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life."
Id.
209 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
210 In other words, the mother's interest is asserted by the Court in abortion decisions,
but it is not present in the stem cell debate. See generally Part III.A. The state's interest
alone transcends the line between the Court's abortion and embryonic research decisions.
In Coleman v. DeWitt, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a state's interest in the protection of
fetal life does not need to be compelling in order to justify some regulations. 282 F.3d 908,
913 (6th Cir. 2002). The case involved an involuntary manslaughter conviction of a man
who kicked his pregnant girlfriend, triggering a miscarriage. Id. at 910. Because punishing
the man's actions did not implicate the woman's rights in any way, the state did not have
to demonstrate a compelling interest. Id. at 913. Thus, the state only needed to show a
rational basis for the punishment. Id. at 913 n.2.
211 In Davis v. Davis, the court concluded that preembryos, while neither strictly
"persons" nor "property," occupy an interim category entitling them to "special respect
because of their potential for human life." 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). However, the
court, rendering its decision in the same year as Casey, had not benefited from Casey's
statement that states have an interest in life even in the first trimester. See Casey, 505 U.S. at
876. Thus, Davis must be interpreted in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Casey. Id.
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fundamental. 212 Thus, a researcher cannot assert a right to use embryos
213
for stem cell research, as that right is not personal per se.
The lower courts echo the Supreme Court on the privacy issue.214 In
Lifchez, the privacy interests asserted on behalf of the mother were
purely physical and thus do not apply to the stem cell debate. 215 For
example, the court's concerns with embryo transfer and chorionic villi
sampling are not present in stem cell research, as the embryo is located
216
outside of a woman's body.
217
Wynn also provides support to states banning stem cell research.
As with stem cell research, the statute in question prohibited
experimentation on fetuses that were already located outside of the
mother's womb. 218 Because of the location of the fetuses, there was no
obstacle to abortion, and the court ruled that the statute did not burden
the mother's rights.219 Instead, this type of regulation was found to be
within the social and heath affairs that states have broad authority to
regulate. 220 Thus, because the embryos in stem cell research are outside
the mother's body, statutes banning stem cell research do not violate the
mother's rights. In addition, the court stated that researchers possess no
fundamental rights to use embryos and are not given constitutional

212 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. "We, therefore, conclude that the right of personalprivacy includes
the abortion decision .. " Id. (emphasis added).
213 See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Il. 1978) affd sub nom. Wynn v.
Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) (declaring that medical researchers do not have a
fundamental right under the Constitution to experiment on fetuses).
214 See Coleman, 282 F.3d at 913 ("If we know anything from Roe, it is that the State has a
legitimate and important interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy, even before
viability.").
215 Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see supra notes 147-67 and
accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. Therefore, the mother's "zone of
privacy" is not impinged. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376. In Lifchez, this zone was impinged
because embryo transfer and chorionic villi sampling were possibly prohibited. Id. Bans
on embryo experimentation do not fall within the zone of privacy because the embryos are
in vitro and not in utero. Casey, supranote 6, at 151 n.8.
217 Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1322; see also supranotes 181-87 and accompanying text.
218 Wynn, 449 F. Supp. at 1322. The statute prohibited experimentation on fetuses aborted
alive. Id.
219

Id.

220 Id. Likewise, a state's regulation of embryonic research would fall within the social
and health affairs, which are within the state's authority to regulate. See id.
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protection to conduct research. 221 Therefore, researchers do not possess a
constitutional right to conduct stem cell research.
Overall, the balance in Roe and Casey involves the mother's interest
against the state's interest. 222 This balance between interests can be
viewed as a scale. On the left side rests the mother's interests in
terminating her pregnancy, avoiding the stigma of unwed motherhood,
and health concerns. Yet with embryonic experimentation, the mother's
interests that are asserted in these cases are missing because the embryo
is already outside of the mother's body and does not relate to any of the
interests outlined by the Supreme Court. 2 No mother's interest in
research, let alone the interest of a scientist, is even asserted. 224 The
interests outlined deal only with her body and lifestyle. On the right
side of the scale is the state's interest in protecting human life, which is
present and affirmed in Roe and Casey.225 Thus, Roe and Casey can be
seen as supporting a strong state interest in protecting potential human
life and supporting the constitutionality of state bans on embryonic
research. 226 Here, the scale weighs heavily in favor of the state interest.
Thus, a "mother's interest" contention against a ban is not a viable
argument and should therefore not be taken into consideration when
analyzing such bans. 22 7 The Court-supported state interest in potential

221

Id.

22n

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-76 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

163 (1973).
M
Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76.
224 Scholar Lawrence Tribe states that "[b]ut for its biological dependence on the woman,
it is at least arguable that the fetus could be regarded as a holder of rights under the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well as the equal protection
clause of the latter." Lawrence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 340 (1985).
With stem cell research, the frozen embryo is not biologically dependent on the woman.
See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. Thus, according to Tribe, it could be argued
that such embryos have Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Tribe, supra, at 340. If so,
the government will be obliged to take affirmative action to "minimize the underlying
conflict and thereby protect the interests of the fetus as well as the interests of the mother."
Tribe, supra, at 341.
225 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 876; Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
226 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (holding that the state has a substantial interest in potential
life throughout pregnancy); Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (stating that Texas has an important and
legitimate interest in protecting potential life); see also Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 908, 912
(6th Cir. 2002) (stating that "the Court in Roe recognized that the state had important
interests in protecting fetal life").
227 This analysis does not take into consideration other types of interests, such as
property interests in embryos, because those interests were not asserted in either the
abortion decisions or the decisions striking down bans on embryonic research. See supra
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life, however, works to create a type of presumption in favor of state
statutes that do not involve the mother's privacy interests as asserted in
Roe and Casey.228

Part II.C-D. However, some litigation has centered on the argument that embryos are
"property." See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). In Davis, the court
ruled that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, "property." Id. at 597. The predicted
future litigation regarding property rights in the field of stem cell research deals mostly
with patents and intellectual property and not as much with the parents' property interests
in determining whether embryos can be donated for scientific purposes. See Judy
Sarasohn, Stein Cell Line Owner Hires a Lobbyist, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2001, at A41.
n8 In support of such a presumption, it should be noted that sixteen states maintain laws
holding that, for purposes other than abortion, life begins at conception, and at least
twenty-one states still possess case law stating that life begins at conception. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (West 2001) (stating that "knowingly or recklessly" killing an unborn
child at any stage of its development is manslaughter); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.1 (West Supp.
2002) (holding that an unborn child is an existing person); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
1999) (maintaining that unlawfully killing a fetus is murder); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/9-1.2 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001) (prohibiting the intentional homicide of an unborn child
and maintaining that an unborn child is "any individual of the human species from
fertilization until birth"); Id. 5/9-2.1 (West 1993) (stating that the killing of an unborn child
without a lawful justification is voluntary manslaughter and maintaining that an unborn
child is "any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth"); Id. 5/9-3.2
(stating that the unintentional killing of an unborn child is involuntary manslaughter and
maintaining that an unborn child is "any individual of the human species from fertilization
until birth"); Id. 5/12-4.4 (holding that intentionally or knowingly causing great harm or
permanent disability to an unborn child is battery and maintaining that an unborn child is
"any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth"); Id. 510/1 (reaffirming
that the policy of the State is that an unborn child is a human being from the moment of
conception and is a legal person); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/2.2 (West 1993) (holding
that the state of gestational development of a human being does not foreclose a cause of
action); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (declaring that the policy of
the State to recognize and protect "the lives of all human beings regardless of their degree
of biological development" will be reinstated); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2 (West Supp.
2002) (stating that a "person" is a human being from the moment of conception); Id. § 9:121
(stating that a human embryo has rights granted by law); Id. § 14:32.5 (defining feticide as
the killing of an unborn child); Id. § 14:32.6 (defining first-degree feticide as an intentional
killing); Id. § 14:32.7 (defining second-degree feticide as an offense "committed in sudden
passion or heat of blood"); Id. § 14:32.8 (defining third-degree feticide as the killing by
criminal negligence); 1991 La. Acts 26 (affirming the State's belief that "life begins at
conception and that life thereafter is a continuum until the time of death"); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12K (West 1996) (stating that an unborn child is an individual human
life from the time of fertilization); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.267 (West Supp. 2001) (defining
first-degree assault of an unborn child); Id. § 609.268 (criminalizing the injury or death of an
unborn child occurring during the commission of a crime); Id. § 609.2661 (declaring the
intentional killing of an unborn child is murder in the first degree); Id. § 609.2662 (stating
that the intentional killing of an unborn without premeditation is murder in the second
degree); Id. § 609.2663 (stating that causing the death of an unborn child by committing
eminently dangerous acts and possessing a depraved mind is third-degree murder); Id. §

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 4

274

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

609.2664 (stating that "intentionally causing the death of an unborn child in the heat of
passion" is manslaughter in the first degree); Id. § 609.2665 (outlining four ways in which
manslaughter of an unborn child in the second degree occurs); Id. § 609.2671 (defining
second-degree assault of an unborn child); Id. § 609.2672 (defining third-degree assault of
an unborn child); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) (stating that life begins at
conception); Id. § 188.015 (defining unborn child as the offspring of human beings at any
point in its biological development); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-103 (2001) (deeming an
unborn child an existing person); Id. § 50-20-102 (reaffirming the state's tradition of
protecting all human life and extending inalienable rights to the unborn); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-17.1-01 (1997) (declaring an unborn child to be the offspring of human beings); Id. §
12.1-17.1-02 (outlining the aspects of murder of an unborn child); Id. § 12.1-17.1-03
(outlining the aspects of manslaughter of an unborn child); Id. § 12.1-17.1-04 (criminalizing
the negligent homicide of an unborn child); Id. § 12.1-17.1-05 (criminalizing the aggravated
assault of an unborn child); Id. § 12.1-17.1-06 (criminalizing the assault of an unborn child);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730 (West 1997) (stating that an unborn child is the offspring
of humans from the moment of conception); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West 2000)
(defining unborn child as "an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from
fertilization until birth"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (Michie 1987) (stating that a person
causing the death of an unborn child will be liable); Id. § 26-1-2 (stating that a child not yet
born is an existing person); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301.1 (1999) (claiming that unborn
children have "inherent and inalienable rights"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.24 (West Supp.
2001) (stating that criminal recklessness includes creating risk or harm to an unborn child);
Id. § 939.25 (including risk and harm to unborn children in the definition of criminal
negligence); Id. § 939.75 (stating that an unborn child is an individual of the human species
from the point of fertilization); Id. § 940.01 (mandating that the killing of an unborn child
with intent is a felony); Id. § 940.04 (stating that an unborn child is a human being from the
time of conception); Id. § 940.08 (including death to an unborn child as a homicide in the
negligent handling of a dangerous weapon); Id. § 940.24 (stating that injury to an unborn
child through the negligent handling of a dangerous weapon is a felony); Wolfe v. Isbell,
280 So. 2d 758, 761 (Ala. 1973) (stating that authorities recognize that an embryo has a
separate existence from its mother); Trent v. State, 73 So. 834, 836 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916)
(recognizing through a medical source that an unborn child acquires the same moral and
legal status as other human beings); Nelson v. Planned Parenthood, 505 P.2d 580, 586 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1973) ("One cannot gainsay a legislative determination that an embryonic or fetal
organism is a 'life' .... [Tihe inevitable result is a human being...."); Simon v. Mullin,
380 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (allowing recovery for prenatal injuries,
regardless of viability); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding that
from "the viewpoint of the civil law and the law of property, a child en ventre sa mere is
not only regarded as a human being, but as such from the moment of conception-which it
is in fact"); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(quoting Prosser as stating that viability does not affect the legal existence of a fetus);
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (Ga. 1956) (holding that the
moment of time before conception during which an injury is sustained is not controlling in
deciding whether there is a cause of action); Morrow v. Scott, No. 88, 1849 WL 1714, at *3
(Ga. Nov. 1849) (stating that a child is "in being" from the moment of conception");
Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 1972) (establishing that "some sort of
independent life begins at conception"); State v. Harris, 136 P. 264, 267 (Kan. 1913) (stating
that for some legal purposes, an unborn child is considered alive at conception); Group
Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1207 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (recognizing a
cause of action for the wrongful death of a non-viable fetus); Vios v. State, 246 A.2d 313,
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The second and only consideration worth evaluating in this context
is vagueness 229 Three factors should be considered in determining
whether or not a statute is unconstitutionally vague.2 30 First, the statute
must have a core meaning. 231 In other words, the statute cannot be
standardless.23 2 It must specify a standard of conduct so that people of
common intelligence know what actions are unlawful. 233 Second, the
statute must contain definite terms.234 Words such as "experiment" and
"therapeutic" must be clearly defined to ensure that enforcement of the

315 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (stating that life and pregnancy are simultaneous at
conception); Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971) (adopting the
reasoning that "justice requires that the principle be recognized that a child has a legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body" and allowing a cause of action for prenatal injury); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. 1949) (recognizing that an
unborn child is a human being); Rodgers v. Danforth, 486 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Mo. 1972)
(allowing the stipulation that "[m]edically, human life is a continuum from conception to
death"); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 137-38 (N.H. 1980) (acknowledging that life may
start at conception); Bennet v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (N.H. 1958) (adopting the opinion
that an unborn child is a separate organism from the moment of conception); Smith v.
Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (N.J. 1960) (stating that medical authorities recognize an unborn
child as a distinct entity and that the law recognizes that an individual's rights can be
violated even before birth); Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 888
(N.Y. 1972) (stating that a fetus is a human and "unquestionably alive"); Kelly v. Gregory,
125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (stating that a fetus is a separate organism);
Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865 (N.D. 1984) (stating that an unborn child is a
person); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 87 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 (Ohio 1949) (recognizing
that in many legal situations, a child is considered in existence from conception); State v.
Ausplund, 167 P. 1019, 1022 (Or. 1917) (holding that "[flrom the moment of conception a
new life has begun"); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Pa. 1985) (maintaining that an
unborn child is a separate individual from the moment of conception); Presley v. Newport
Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1976) (recognizing the view of other courts and medical
authorities that an unborn child is a separate entity from the moment of conception); Sylvia
v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (R.I. 1966) (stating it is a medical fact that an unborn child is a
living human being from conception); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820, 822 (Tex. 1967), rev'g 413 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App. 1967) (considering that medical science
maintains that life begins at conception and following the dissenting opinion of Justice
Cadena in the lower court opinion, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 825, 828
(Tex. App. 1967)); Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Va. 1990) (upholding a cause of
action for injuries occurring before birth). Other sources indicate that a total of thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia "recognize expressly or impliedly by statute, resolution,
and/or court decision that 'fertilization' and 'conception' initiates the life of a human
being." Adams, supra note 40, at 124; see also Davidson, supra note 12, at 79 n.19.
229

See supra Part II.D.

230 See supra Part IL.D.
231 See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735
F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. I1. 1990); supra note 163.
232 MargaretS., 794 F.2d at 999.
233 Id; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376.
234 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
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statute will not be arbitrary or capricious. 235 Third, the statute cannot
produce a chilling effect caused by undefined terms and the possibility
of arbitrary enforcement. 236 The terms and enforcement clauses of the
statute cannot cause researchers and doctors to simply stop
experimenting because they fear prosecution. 237 These three factors are
used in the next section to evaluate the constitutionality of current state
238
laws banning embryonic research.
B.

Current State Law on Embryonic Experimentation

States take different approaches when regulating embryonic
experimentation. 239 Some states completely ban experimentation on

235 Id.; see also Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1995); Margaret S., 794
F.2d at 999. It should be noted, however, that the terms "experiment," "research," and
"therapy" are actually terms of art. For example, the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research defined accepted
therapy, or "practice," as "interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being
of an individual patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of success." THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 2 (1978). On the other hand, "research" is "an

activity designed to test a hypothesis, permits conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge." Id. at 3. Thus, the distinction between
"practice" and "research" is obvious. However, because the courts in Lifchez, Jane L., and
Margaret S. did not regard such terms as terms of art, it is pertinent that states define such
words in order to avoid the vagueness issues that plagued the statutes in those decisions.
See generally Part II.D.
236 Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1502; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
237 Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1502; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
2M See infra Part III.B.
239 Even those states that do not ban experimentation completely still regulate
experimentation on embryos to a degree. Ten states prohibit experimentation on aborted
embryos and fetuses. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2302 (1993) (stating that an embryo
resulting from an induced abortion cannot be used for medical experimentation or research
unless the purpose of such research is to diagnose a condition in the mother and the
abortion was performed for that purpose); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-802 (Michie 2000)
(prohibiting research on fetuses born alive as the result of an abortion, unless the research
benefits the fetus, and prohibiting research on fetuses born dead after abortion without the
consent of the mother); CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE § 123440 (West 1996) (banning the use
of aborted products of human conception except that which is beneficial to the life of the
fetus); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-6 (1998) (banning all experimentation on aborted fetuses except
pathological examinations); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.037 (1996) ("No person shall use any
fetus or child born alive for any type of scientific, research, laboratory or other kind of
experimentation either prior to or subsequent to any abortion procedure except as
necessary to protect or preserve the life and health of such fetus or child aborted alive.");
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-346 (1995) (stating that no child aborted alive can be used for
experimentation unless as necessary to preserve the life of the infant); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2919.14 (West 1997) (prohibiting experimentation on the products of human
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embryos. 240 Others simply limit experimentation before or after
expulsion from the mother's womb. 241 Regardless of the approach, the
statutes will be struck down if vague. 242
1.

243
States Completely Banning Experimentation

244
Seven states currently ban embryonic experimentation entirely.
Although the Louisiana statute banning experimentation on unborn

conception that have been aborted); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-735 (2001) (banning the
experimentation on children resulting from abortions unless such experimentation is
therapeutic to the child); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-17 (Michie 1994) (stating that a child
subject to an induced abortion may not be used in animal or human research); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-15-208 (1997) (prohibiting experimentation on aborted fetuses without the
consent of the mother). North Dakota also prohibits experimentation on fetuses born dead
as a result of occurrences other than abortion. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (1997).
Michigan prohibits experimentation on dead embryos without the consent of the mother.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2688 (West 2001). Still other states simply regulate aspects
of research. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2001) ("No preembryo shall be
maintained ex utero in the noncryo-preserved state beyond 14 days post-fertilization
development."); see generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-5 (Michie 2000) (providing
standards for determining lawful clinical research activity and consent provisions).
240
241
242

See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part II.D.

243 When a state bans experimentation on embryos, a person may not be able to get
around the law by simply selling or donating embryos for scientists to use in another state
because eight states have laws prohibiting such sale of embryos. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 436.026 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (stating that the sale, transfer, or distribution of a live child
resulting from an abortion is a Class B felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2000)
(prohibiting the sale of human embryos); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992)
(forbidding the distribution of live human fetuses); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J
(West 1996) (prohibiting the sale, transfer, distribution, and donation of fetuses); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998) (stating that "whoever buys or sells a living human
conceptus ... is guilty of a gross misdemeanor"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342 (1995)
(forbidding the "sale, transfer, distribution, or giving away" of live children born as a result
of abortion); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-735 (1997) (stating that the sale of an unborn child is
prohibited); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-115 (Michie 2001) (forbidding the sale, transfer,
distribution, and donation of live aborted children). The sale of cell lines, however, may be
exempt. For example, it may be legal to sell the stem cells already cultured from an
embryo. On the other hand, Minnesota will only allow the sale of cell lines established
from nonliving embryos. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998) (stating that the law
does not forbid "the buying and selling of a cell culture line or lines taken from a nonliving
human conceptus"). Cell lines are created after the stem cells are removed from the
embryo and cultured to regenerate indefinitely. Text of President Bush's Speech, supra note
13, at A12.
244 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(6) (West 2002) (banning the use of any live fetus "for
any type of scientific, research, laboratory, or other kind of experimentation"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2000) (prohibiting the destruction of any in vitro fertilized human
ovum); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992) (stating that the use of intrauterine
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children was held unconstitutional, the State still maintains a law stating
that a "viable in vitro fertilized human ovum" is a juridical person and
cannot be intentionally destroyed. 245 In this context, the word "viable"
does not have the same meaning as it does in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Instead, a "viable in vitro fertilized human ovum" is an
embryo that is in a state of development. 246 According to the statute, a
cryopreserved embryo is considered viable. 247 Thus, embryos created in
the IVF industry and cryopreserved cannot be used for stem cell research
in Louisiana, as removal of the stem cell will necessarily destroy the
embryo. 248 On the other hand, a non-viable in vitro fertilized ovum is
one that fails to develop further over a thirty-six hour period of time. 249
In other words, the ovum is already dead, as it is no longer developing
toward birth. Such non-viable embryos are available for research
because the research will not destroy the life of the embryos. In
analyzing the constitutionality of this statute, it should first be
acknowledged that the state does have an important interest in the

and extrauterine human fetuses or products of conception cannot be used for scientific or
any form of experimentation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001) (prohibiting
research on embryos if the research will substantially jeopardize the life or health of the
embryo); MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (1998) (stating that anyone who uses a living human
conceptus for experimentation that is not harmless to the embryo is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-3 (Michie 2000) (stating that a fetus cannot be
used for clinical research unless "the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of
the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the minimum extent
necessary to meet such needs or no significant risk to the fetus is imposed by the research
activity"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216 (2000) (stating that "any person who knowingly
performs any type of nontherapeutic experimentation or nontherapeutic medical
procedure" upon an unborn child is guilty of a third-degree felony and defining
"nontherapeutic" as "that which is not intended to preserve the life or health of the child
upon whom it is performed").
245 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2000). Louisiana defines "human embryo" as an in
vitro fertilized human ovum. Id. § 9:121.
246 Id. § 9:129. The statute states:
A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which
shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical
person or through the actions of any other such person. An in vitro
fertilized human ovum that fails to develop further over a thirty-six
hour period except when the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation,
is considered non-viable and is not considered a juridical person.
Id.
247

Id.

248

THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xviii; Quinn, supra note

17, at 852.
249

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129.
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Thus, the main consideration is

First, a statute must contain a core meaning. 25 Here, there is a
specified standard enabling people of common intelligence to know
what is unlawful.252 Louisiana has stated that embryos cannot be
destroyed.253 A person of common intelligence should know that
destroying an embryo is unlawful, and actions taken to intentionally
destroy an embryo will be punished. 254 Second, a statute must contain
definite terms to ensure that enforcement will not be arbitrary or
capricious. 255 Louisiana specifically set out what is and is not considered
a "viable in vitro fertilized human ovum." 256 Any action that destroys a
"viable in vitro fertilized ovum" is simply not allowed. Research on a
"non-viable" human ovum is allowed, even if the ovum is destroyed.257
Research on a viable human ovum is allowed when such research will
not destroy the ovum.258 While the use of the term "viable" in this
context is slightly confusing, the statute does explain the State's use of
the word. Thus, the terms make clear which actions are lawful and
which are unlawful. Because there is a definite line between lawful and
unlawful conduct, the statute does not invite arbitrary or capricious
enforcement.
A third requirement is that a statute must not produce a chilling
effect caused by undefined terms and the possibility of arbitrary
enforcement.259 Because the Louisiana statute's terms are clear and do
not invite arbitrary enforcement, the statute is unlikely to produce a
chilling effect. However, one argument is that a scientist or doctor may
inadvertently destroy a human ovum while performing some other
procedure or test. The statute provides that a human ovum cannot be

25 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162
(1973).
251 See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735
F. Supp. 1361,1372 (N.D. Il.1990); supra note 163.
252 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
253 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129.

2M Id.; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
255 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
2% LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129. The State also avoided the vagueness problems
associated with terms such as "experiment" and "nontherapeutic" by not using those terms
in prohibiting the destruction of embryos. Id.
257

Id.

2M

Id.

259 Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995); Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364
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intentionally destroyed. 260
Thus, only those people intentionally
destroying these embryos are liable for their actions. Overall, the statute
appears to avoid the vagueness problems that invalidated past laws.
Michigan also prohibits nontherapeutic research on an embryo if
that research "substantially jeopardizes" the embryo's life.261 While a
standard stating that conduct that "substantially jeopardizes" the
embryo may appear foggy, Michigan's clearly defined terms develop its
core meaning and provide a standard through which scientists can know
which procedures are unlawful. Unlike the overturned Illinois statute in
Lifchez, 262 the Michigan statute defines "nontherapeutic" as scientific or
laboratory research or experimentation that will not improve the health
of the research subject. 263 Michigan also elaborates on permissible
"experimentation." 264 Because the statute is not to be read as prohibiting
procedures beneficial to the embryo or the mother, experiments such as
embryo transfer, which concerned the court in Lifchez, will not be
prohibited. 265 Because the statute possesses a core meaning with clearly
defined terms, it is unlikely to lead to a chilling effect of lawful research.

260 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129.
261 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001). This statute states:

A person shall not use a live human embryo, fetus, or neonate for
nontherapeutic research if, in the best judgment of the person
conducting the research, based upon the available knowledge or
information at the approximate time of the research, the research
substantially jeopardizes the life or health of the embryo, fetus, or
neonate. Nontherapeutic research shall not in any case be performed
on an embryo or fetus known by the person conducting the research to
be the subject of a planned abortion being performed for any purpose
other than to protect the life of the mother.
Id.
262 See supra notes 147-67 and accompanying text.
263 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2692 (West 2001). More specifically, the statute states

that "'nontherapeutic research' means scientific or laboratory research, or other kind of
experimentation or investigation not designed to improve the health of the research
subject." Id.
264 Id. § 333.2686. Section 2686 of the statute states:
Sections 2685 to 2691 shall not prohibit or regulate diagnostic,
assessment, or treatment procedures, the purpose of which is to
determine the life or status or improve the health of the embryo, fetus,
or neonate involved or the mother involved.
Id.
265 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania also maintains a definition of "nontherapeutic" in its
ban on the experimentation on unborn children.266
Only
experimentation that will preserve the life or health of that particular
embryo is permitted. 267 However, the statute fails to provide a clear
definition of "unborn child[ren]." 268 For example, Pennsylvania may
have intended for the statute to apply only to those children in utero,
rather than in vitro. If so, the interests of the mother are still in place and
must be analyzed, and a person of common intelligence may not be
alerted as to exactly what conduct is unlawful. 269 Thus, while the State
does alert physicians as to what type of research will be allowed, it is
vague in its use of the words "unborn child," which could in turn lead to
270
arbitrary or capricious enforcement.
Minnesota's statute banning embryonic research outlines both
permitted and nonpermitted experimentation. 271 A "living human
conceptus" cannot be used for any research not performed to protect the
life of the embryo involved. 272 However, if verifiable scientific evidence
has shown an experiment to be harmless to the embryo, that experiment
may be performed. 273 Thus, the statute sets forth a standard for

266

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216(a) (2000). The statute states:

Any person who knowingly performs any type of nontherapeutic
experimentation or nontherapeutic medical procedure (except an
abortion as defined in this chapter) upon any unborn child, or upon
any child born alive during the course of an abortion, commits a felony
in the third degree. "Nontherapeutic" means that which is not
intended to preserve the life or health of the child upon whom it is
performed.
Id.
267
268

Id.
See id.

269 Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.
Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
270 Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
r7

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998). The Minnesota statute states:

Subdivision 1. Penalty. Whoever uses or permits the use of a living
human conceptus for any type of scientific, laboratory research or
other experimentation except to protect the life or health of the
conceptus, or except as herein provided, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id. The term "human conceptus" includes embryos fertilized in vitro. Id. § 145.421.
Id. § 145.422.
273 Id. Subdivision 2 of § 145.422 states: "The use of a living human conceptus for
research or experimentation which verifiable scientific evidence has shown to be harmless
to the conceptus shall be permitted." Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2002], Art. 4

282

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

determining what conduct is lawful: harmless research is allowed but
274
research detrimental to the life of the conceptus is not.
Minnesota defines "human conceptus" as any human organism,
whether conceived inside the womb or through IVF procedures, from
the moment of fertilization through the first 265 days. 275 However, the
use of embryos fertilized in vitro produces an interesting dilemma.
When cryopreserved, embryos created through the IVF process can
survive indefinitely in a frozen state.276 The question then arises whether
time also freezes. The 265 days may simply indicate time spent in
gestation, or it may suggest that the embryos can be used 265 days after
conception without reference to their gestational age. In other words, a
five-day-old cryopreserved embryo may actually be in existence for 266
days while still in its five-day-old state. Although a technicality, it is one
that researchers could argue invites arbitrary enforcement due to the
indefinite terms.
Maine has one of the more troubling statutes from a constitutional
standpoint. 277
The statute regulates in three different situations:
intrauterine fetuses, extrauterine fetuses, and any products of conception
considered "live born." 278 One potential problem involves the regulation
of experimentation in utero. Because the statute is virtually standardless,
physicians and scientists may not know which actions are unlawful. For
example, the statute seems to impinge the zone of privacy that concerned
the court in Lifchez.279 It may or may not prohibit procedures such as
chorionic villi sampling or embryo transfer. 28° In addition, this aspect of

274 Id.; MargaretS., 794 F.2d at 999; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376.
275 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421 (West 1998) ("'Human conceptus' means any human
organism, conceived either in the human body or produced in an artificial environment
other than the human body, from fertilization through the first 265 days thereafter.").
276 Rubin, supra note 13, at 1A. Frozen embryos will literally survive for thousands of
years. Id.
277 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992). Section 1593 states:
Whoever shall use, transfer, distribute or give away any live human
fetus, whether intrauterine or extrauterine, or any product of
conception considered live born for scientific experimentation or for
any form of experimentation shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $5,000 and by imprisonment for not more than 5 years and any
person consenting, aiding or assisting shall be liable to like
punishment.
Id.
278

Id.

27
2W

See supranote 160 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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the statute raises the privacy interests of the mother and may not be
constitutional under Roe and Casey.281 Maine's statute also faces other
vagueness problems. For example, even for the extrauterine fetuses, the
terms are not definite.
The statute forbids "any form of
experimentation." 2 2 As such, a chilling effect seems unavoidable.
While there are only seven states that completely ban
experimentation, there are a few more states that ban research before or
after an embryo is expelled from the mother's womb. 2 3 The same
vagueness standards set forth above can be used in evaluating these
statutes.
2.

States Banning Experimentation Before and After Expulsion from the
Womb

A few states prohibit experimentation on embryos before and after
expulsion from the mother's womb.284 These laws pose a potential
problem because they also regulate experimentation while the embryo is
still within the mother. 285 On the other hand, when dealing with
embryos that have been expelled from the mother's womb, the same
vagueness considerations apply. The Massachusetts statute states that
embryos cannot be used "for scientific, laboratory, research, or other
kind of experimentation." 2 6 While at first blush the standard appears
broad and ill-defined, the statute goes on to explain and define what
types of procedures are allowed. For example, procedures that will not

281 See supra Part II.C.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593.

282

M See infra Part III.B.2.
n4 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01
(1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (2000).
285 See Part III.A for a discussion of the mother's interests. However, we are not
concerned here with experimentation while the embryo is still inside the mother because
this is not an issue for stem cell research purposes. Casey, supra note 6, at 151 n.8.
2% MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)l. The statute provides:
No person shall use any live human fetus whether before or after
expulsion from its mother's womb, for scientific, laboratory, research
or other kind of experimentation. This section shall not prohibit
procedures incident to the study of a human fetus while it is in its
mother's womb, provided that in the best medical judgment of the
physician, made at the time of the study, said procedures do not
substantially jeopardize the life or health of the fetus, and provided
said fetus is not the subject of a planned abortion.
Id. While the language of the statute uses the term "fetus," the statute also provides that
the term includes embryos. Id. § 12J(a)IV.
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"substantially jeopardize the life or health of the fetus" are allowed. 287
The statute also does not apply to procedures used to determine or
preserve the life or health of the embryo or mother involved. 288 North
Dakota and Rhode Island's statutes are almost identical to the
289
Massachusetts statute.
As is seen through these statutes, and those discussed previously, it
is difficult to avoid the problem of vagueness when promulgating
statutes regulating experimentation.
Yet the vagueness standards
provided by the courts, along with an understanding of the
constitutionality of current state law, provide a framework for drafting
constitutional bans on stem cell and embryonic research. 290
V. MODEL STATUTES BANNING EXPERIMENTATION 29 1

There are two possible approaches to promulgating a constitutional
ban on stem cell research. The first is a more specific statute, banning
only stem cell research itself. The second is a more inclusive statute,
banning both stem cell research and other types of embryonic
experimentation. In either approach, the statutes must be written to
substantially weigh the state's interest, while avoiding issues regarding
the mother's right to privacy and right to terminate her pregnancy. In
addition, both approaches must fall within certain standards to avoid
292
vagueness problems. First, the statutes must have a core meaning.
Thus, a ban on experimentation must set forth a clear standard alerting

287 Id. § 12J(a)I.

2M

Id.

289 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1997) ("A person may not use any live human fetus,

whether before or after expulsion from its mother's womb, for scientific, laboratory,
research, or other kind of experimentation. This section does not prohibit procedures ...
[that] do not substantially jeopardize the life or health of the fetus ....
");R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-54-1 (2000) ("No person shall use any live human fetus, whether before or after the
expulsion from its mother's womb, for scientific, laboratory research, or other kind of
experimentation. This section does not prohibit procedures... [that] do not substantially
jeopardize the life or health of the fetus ....
").North Dakota also provides that the statute
"does not prohibit or regulate diagnostic or remedial procedures, the purpose of which is
to determine the life or health of the fetus involved or to preserve the life or health of the
fetus involved, or of the mother involved." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01(3). The statute
in Rhode Island provides the same exception. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(c).
290 See infra Part IV.
291 Although there is currently no state statute identical to the model statutes presented,
aspects of the model statutes are based on various current state statutes.
292 Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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293
people of common intelligence as to what conduct is unlawful.
294
Second, the state must clearly define the terms used in the statutes.
This includes providing examples of what experimentation is and is not
allowed. Third, the statutes cannot cause a chilling effect. 295 If the terms
are not well defined, arbitrary enforcement may follow. 296 Different
officials will decide what experimentation is unlawful by using different
standards. This arbitrary enforcement may lead a scientist or physician
to simply stop experimenting for fear of possible prosecution under the
statute. This type of chilling effect is constitutionally unacceptable.

The following is a model statute banning embryonic stem cell
research:
§ 1. Public Policy
The policy of this State is to protect the life of every unborn child,
from fertilization until birth, regardless of their degree of biological
development, to the extent permitted by the federal Constitution. 297 An
embryo conceived through in vitro fertilization, though not yet
implanted or born, is deemed an unborn child and existing legal person
for purposes of this statute. 298
§ 2. Embryonic Stem Cell Research Prohibited
(a) No embryo, or any unborn child, shall be used for purposes of
embryonic stem cell research.

293
24
295
296

Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986); Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376.
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995); Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364.
Arbitrary enforcement includes the lack of enforcement.

297

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Banks-Baldwin 2002).

Kentucky's General Assembly

holds that if the United States Consitution is amended, or if the Supreme Court's abortion
decisions are ever reversed, the State would "recognize and protect the lives of all human
beings regardless of their degree of biological development." Id.
298 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002) ("A child conceived, but not yet born,
is deemed an existing person .... ); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/1 (West 1993)
(declaring Illinois' longstanding policy that "the unborn child is a human being from the
time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the unborn child's right
to life and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of
this State").
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(b) Definitions
1.

"Embryo." An embryo is an unborn child created through
the in vitro fertilization process. 299

2.

"Unborn child." An unborn child is a human life existing
300
and developing from fertilization until birth.

3.

"Embryonic stem cell research."
Embryonic stem cell
research is the derivation of embryonic stem cells, obtained
by destroying the outer shell of the embryo and removing
the inner cell mass, thus destroying the embryo and the
potential life of the embryo in the process. 30'

4.

"Embryonic stem cells."
Embryonic stem cells are the
building block cells that develop into the specialized cells
30 2
and tissues of the human body.

Commentary
The first, and perhaps most simple, manner of prohibiting stem cell
research within a state is to have a statute focused solely on stem cell
research itself. Because the egg is fertilized outside of the mother's body,
such a statute would avoid many of the issues regarding the mother's
rights. 303 For example, stem cell research does not involve terminating

299 See supranotes 7-12 and accompanying text.
"o 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002) (defining an unborn
child as "any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth"); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12K (West 1996) (stating that an unborn child is an "individual
human life in existence and developing from fertilization until birth"); MO. REV. STAT. §
188.015 (West 1996) (defining unborn child as "the offspring of human beings from the
moment of conception until birth and at every stage of its biological development,
including the human conceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus"); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-1-103 (2001) (providing that a child conceived, while not yet born, is an
existing person); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-1-2 (Michie 1999) (stating that "[a] child
conceived, but not born," is an existing person).
301 THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE, supra note 20, at xvii; Varmus, supra note
12, at 48; see also supranotes 19-22 and accompanying text.
302 Lee, supra note 4, at 81; Quinn, supra note 17, at 851; Stolberg, supra note 17, at Al; see
also McGinley, supra note 18, at A20 (terming embryonic stem cells as "primitive buildingblock cells").
303 Casey, supra note 6, at 151 n.8.
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an unwanted "pregnancy." 3° 4 Nor is there a question of the mother's
physical health as asserted in Roe and Casey. In addition, banning stem
cell research does not force the mother into a "distressful life and
future."3 5 Even the NIH does not consider the mother's privacy and
right to terminate pregnancy in its Guidelines recommending stem cell
research. 30 6 In addition, by simply banning stem cell research, a state
would avoid the issues involved in diagnostic procedures that may or
may not preserve the life and health of the embryo. For example, the
court's concerns in Lifchez regarding chorionic villi sampling and embryo
transfer are nonexistent when the embryo is in a frozen state outside of
the mother's womb.3° 7 Banning stem cell research avoids the sticky
process of differentiating what is and is not beneficial to the embryo.
The statute must still conform to vagueness standards. If the statute
is narrowly drawn and only targets stem cell research, the state can
explain what falls within the zone of such experimentation. Thus the
statute should include the state's definition of stem cell research. This
would alert people "of common intelligence" as to what conduct is
considered unlawful and deter a chilling effect among researchers in the
field. 30 8 However, because the statute is so narrowly drawn, states
should consider the following model statute and expand the regulation
in order to reach a broader range of embryonic experimentation:
§ 1. Public Policy
The policy of this State is to protect the life of every unborn child, from
fertilization until birth, regardless of their degree of biological
development, to the extent permitted by the federal Constitution. 3° 9 A
human conceptus is deemed an unborn child and existing legal person
310
for purposes of this statute.

304 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICrIONARY, supra note 201, at 1730. As such, stem cell

research does not fit within the pregnancy interests asserted in Roe and Casey. See supra
notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
305 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
306 See generally National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human
Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (Aug. 25, 2000).
W
See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361,1367-68 (N.D.IIl. 1990).
3M
Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376.
3o9 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
310 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/1
(West 1993).
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§ 2. Destruction and Experimentation Prohibited; Exceptions
(a) A living human conceptus is a juridical person and shall not be
intentionally destroyed by any other person or through the
311
actions of such a person.
(b) A living human conceptus shall not be used for research or
experimentation that is not performed to protect the life or
health of the particular embryo involved. 312 Such research or
experimentation includes:
1.

313
Nontherapeutic research or experimentation;

2.

Research or experimentation that will substantially
jeopardize the life or health of the human conceptus; 314 and

3.

Other research or experimentation that includes:
a.

Procedures where the subject used gains no direct
benefit;315 and

b.

Procedures where the researcher uses the subject merely
to increase his own knowledge or to increase the
316
knowledge of his professional field.

(c) Procedures that do not substantially jeopardize the life or health
317
of the human conceptus are allowed.
1.

This section does not prohibit or regulate diagnostic,
assessment, or treatment procedures, the purpose of which
is to determine the life or status or improve the health of the
318
living human conceptus.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 2000).
312 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998).
311

313 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001).
314 Id.

315 Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
316
Id.
317 MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996).
318 Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2686 (West 2001).
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This section does not preclude the use of a living human
conceptus for research or experimentation which verifiable
scientific evidence has shown to be harmless to the
319
conceptus.

(d) Definitions
1.

"Human conceptus." A human conceptus is any human
organism, conceived either in the human body or through
the in vitro fertilization process, from fertilization until
320
birth.

2.

"Destruction." Destruction of the human conceptus occurs
when the conceptus is harmed to such a degree that it is no
longer capable of maturing toward birth. If the leftover
products of the human conceptus thrive, the conceptus is
still deemed destroyed.

3.

"Nontherapeutic research." Nontherapeutic research is any
scientific or laboratory experimentation not designed to
improve the health of the research subject directly
involved .321

4.

"Living." A human conceptus is not living when it fails to
develop over a thirty-six hour period. 322 A human conceptus
created and frozen through cryopreservation is deemed
323
living.

Commentary
Constitutionally banning embryonic experimentation and not
limiting the ban to stem cell research is a little more difficult, as is
324
evidenced by the overturned statutes in Louisiana, Illinois, and Utah.
The first step in promulgating such a statute is to avoid placing the
state's interest in protecting potential life in competition with the
mother's interest in privacy and in terminating her pregnancy. One

319

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1998).

320
321

Id. § 145.421.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.

§

333.2692 (West 2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

(West 2000).
322

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (West 2000).

323

Id.
See supra Part I.D.

324
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approach is to clearly define which embryos the statute is regulating.
For example, the state could limit the ban to the use of frozen embryos
created through the IVF process for implantation. However, narrowing
the statute to such a degree substantially limits the state from regulating
other types of unwanted research. Indeed, when limited to IVF embryos,
the statute would read much like a ban solely on stem cell research.
Thus, a better approach is to ban experimentation but provide
exceptions. These exceptions include diagnostic procedures used to
determine or preserve the life of the embryo and procedures that do not
jeopardize the life of the embryo. The state may also ban nontherapeutic
experimentation and provide a definition for determining what is and
what is not "nontherapeutic."
The state must clearly define the terms it uses in banning embryonic
research. A definition of "experimentation" must be provided, along
with the explanations of the exceptions already mentioned. 325 For
example, the prohibited experimentation would include research where
the embryo gains no direct benefit, but rather the researcher is simply
increasing personal knowledge. The definition should also include
instances where the researcher uses the embryo simply to gain
information to use in another procedure.
On the other hand,
"experimentation" should not include procedures that merely have not
yet been used exhaustively so as to warrant the terminology "test."
Another term that is necessary to define is "destruction." This is needed
to deter any arguments that stem cell research is not "destructive"
because the stem cell continues to grow. Such measures will better
enable states to promulgate constitutional statutes banning embryonic
research.
V.

CONCLUSION

The issues surrounding the stem cell debate are numerous and
complex. This Note examines one specific area of the controversy: the
constitutionality of the current state bans on embryonic research. While
Supreme Court abortion decisions balance the mother's right to privacy
against the state's interest in potential life, the mother's interest has

325 Arguably, the word "experimentation" is a term of art and should alert scientists as to
what a statute is prohibiting. See supra note 235. However, because of the holdings in
Lifchez, Jane L., and Margaret S., it is best to include definitions in order to memorialize a
state's intentions and to clear up any ambiguities a court may perceive. An alternative is to
reference within the statute that the state is using the definitions as laid out in the Belmont
Report of the Office for Protection from Research Risks. See supra note 235.
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never been used to strike down a ban on embryonic research. Instead,
In order to pass
the courts have focused solely on vagueness.
constitutional muster, a statute must meet three standards to avoid being
struck down as vague. First, the statute must have a core meaning. It
cannot be standardless, but must inform people of common intelligence
what actions are prohibited. Second, the statute must contain definite
terms to ensure that enforcement will not be arbitrary or capricious.
Third, the statute cannot produce a chilling effect caused by undefined
terms and the possibility of arbitrary enforcement. With these standards
in mind, this Note proposes two model statutes. The first focuses
exclusively on banning stem cell research, while the second prohibits a
broader range of embryonic experimentation. Recognizing the need to
promulgate statutes according to the vagueness standards and
examining the model statutes set forth in this Note will assist states in
creating constitutional laws focused on protecting their interest in
human life.
Mailee R. Harris*
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